


William Henry Chamberlin - A Durable Peace in Europe - 1 October 1944

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Richard M. Feynman

A DURABLE PEACE IN EUROPE



By WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN



CONTENTS

	PAGE
FOREWORD	4
A DURABLE PEACE IN EUROPE	5
I. Why Europe Matters	5
II. Effects of the War	15
III. Pivotal Germany	24
IV. Europe West	36
V. Europe East	46
VI. Europe's Alternatives	59
OUTLINE FOR STUDY COURSE	70
APPENDIX—STATEMENT ON THE PEACE SETTLEMENT IN EUROPE, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO GERMANY	74
BIBLIOGRAPHY	77

*Published for the use of study groups in the churches
by the*

COMMISSION ON A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE

Instituted by

THE FEDERAL COUNCIL OF THE CHURCHES OF CHRIST
IN AMERICA

297 Fourth Avenue

New York 10, N. Y.

20 cents per copy; 25 copies, 15 cents each; 100 or more, 11 cents each

FOREWORD

MANY in the churches have been studying the *Six Pillars of Peace*. These have to do largely with the kind of world order required for a just and durable peace. The terms of the peace settlement, however, will profoundly affect the working of any world organization which may be established. It is, therefore, equally important that Christians should become informed on the problems involved in such settlement. The study of the *Guiding Principles* and the *Six Pillars* particularly in the light of current proposals for action in developing world organizations needs to be continued and extended, but the particular problems of the peace need also to be considered.

To meet this need the Commission is issuing two pamphlets, one on "A Durable Peace in Eastern Asia" by Willis Lamott and one on "A Durable Peace in Europe" by William Henry Chamberlin. These are designed to give background material for a better understanding of the problem and, in each case, the issues involved in any peace settlement are analyzed from the point of view of the author and alternative solutions suggested.

In dealing with such problems as this the Christian is often at a loss to know what solutions are required by his faith. He is dealing in an area of practical decision where Christian principles are not as yet generally recognized to be determinative. However, his failure to come to any practical decision, because an ideal solution is not attainable, permits the decision to go by default so far as his influence is concerned. The sound line to follow would seem to be for the Christian to bring all proposals under the criticism of his faith and strive for solutions that under the circumstances seem most nearly to meet his basic convictions. The questions for study, following the text of the pamphlets, are designed to help in such a process.

It will be clear to those who use these pamphlets that the opinions expressed are those of the authors themselves and do not necessarily represent the opinions of the Commission or its officers. The Commission issues them for study and discussion in the hope that they may help many to crystalize their own thinking on these important problems.

October 1, 1944

A DURABLE PEACE IN EUROPE

WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN

I. WHY EUROPE MATTERS

The creation of conditions that will make for a peaceful, orderly and prosperous Europe, is, or should be a primary objective of the American people. The time has long passed when it could be plausibly argued that Europe's affairs are no concern of ours.

Within the memory of a single generation America has been drawn into two world wars. Both of these wars originated in Europe. Even the Far Eastern phase of the present conflict can be traced to the rise of Hitlerite Germany as a formidable military power. It was only after Germany had overrun the whole of Europe outside of Russia and was absorbing the major part of the British and American war effort that the Japanese militarists ventured to strike.

IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVES

So the restoration of a Europe that has been so fearfully ravaged by wars and violent revolutions is dictated not only by altruism and sentiment, but by most pressing considerations of national interest. Of course American power after the war will not be unlimited. But it will be considerable. And in relation to the European settlement this power should be applied to the attainment of the following objectives:

- (1) A generous and vigorous relief and reconstruction program, designed to help the Europeans to help themselves at the earliest possible moment.
- (2) Respect for the Atlantic Charter clauses which provide for self-determination as the basis for drawing frontier lines.
- (3) Promotion of larger economic units, in the form of regional federations, in order to take advantage of the mass production facilities of modern industry.
- (4) Encouragement in all European countries of genuinely representative governments, subject to popular control. Puppet

regimes which may be necessary during periods of military occupation should be liquidated as quickly as possible.

(5) An international charter of civil liberties for the whole of Europe, with freedom of press and radio broadcasting assured by international convention, together with abolition of all peacetime censorship.

(6) International action to promote the restoration, as far as possible, of three freedoms of the nineteenth century: free movement of ideas, men and goods.

It is by the realization or nonrealization of such a program that one may reasonably judge, a few years after the end of the present conflict, whether Europe, and the world, are on the road to a lasting peace or to a third, and more terrible world war. For the crisis of Europe has reached such proportions that only a bold attempt to remove the fundamental causes of war will suffice. A patchwork settlement, compounded of revenge and expediency and conceived solely in terms of holding down the defeated powers will possess no element of permanence whatever, even if such a settlement is advocated on alleged grounds of "realism."

If one examines the six points more closely, one can see how each fits into a program of the total peace that, one may hope, will replace the total war that has inflicted such terrible wounds on the entire body of European and world civilization.

RELIEF AND RECONSTRUCTION

The case for a generous relief and reconstruction activity is surely obvious. One cannot expect starving and disease-ridden people to set up stable democracies. The American Government was properly quick to recognize its obligation to repair, so far as a monetary payment could do so, the loss in lives and property inflicted through the accidental bombing of the Swiss town of Schaffhausen.

Much heavier damage has been inflicted on France and other occupied countries through bombing and through the severe enforcement of a blockade on food shipments. There is a difference of opinion as to how far these measures were justified by military exigencies. But there can be no doubt that a moral

debt has been created to the suffering peoples of these lands; and this debt can only be discharged by giving the UNRRA the authority and facilities which it will need to bring relief where it will be most needed after the war.

SELF-DETERMINATION

It may be recalled that the first three clauses of the Atlantic Charter read as follows:

First, their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other.

Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned.

Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been deprived of them.

These clauses should not be regarded as sentimental abstractions. For they are based on an unmistakable lesson of history: that the forcible imposition of alien sovereignty on a people has been a frequent and serious cause of war. There are, of course, limits beyond which the principle of self-determination cannot be pushed. Central Europe, especially, is an area where peoples of various national stocks are almost inextricably intermingled, where the most objective and painstaking effort to draw just frontier lines would leave some racial enclaves on the wrong side of the boundary.

In some such cases a federal constitution, with a wide grant of local autonomy, would provide an acceptable solution. In case of extreme necessity an exchange of population could be organized. But the cause of future peace will be harmed, not advanced, if there are any glaring violations of the principle that people are entitled to choose the nation to which they wish to belong.

It would be a sound procedure to take the frontiers of 1937, before Hitler carried out the annexation of Austria by force and threat of force, as a starting point and to permit modifications of these frontiers only as a result of free plebiscites, conducted

under impartial international authority. There would be great difficulties because of the dispersion of millions of people as a result of war and labor conscription. Only persons who were residents of the districts concerned before the outbreak of the war should be permitted to vote.

But the principle of self-determination should not be sacrificed on the altar of annexationist ambitions and unscrupulous power politics. By a free plebiscite one would understand a vote taken without the presence of troops or police of any power interested in the outcome, with guaranties for the maintenance of civil liberties during the period before the voting and for secrecy and honesty in casting and counting the ballots.

There should be no reversion to the practice of treating territory and the people who inhabit it as spoils of victory. Not one of the leading United Nations could plausibly assert a need for territorial expansion. The chances of permanent peace in Europe will be in inverse ratio to the number of people who are living under undesired foreign rule, or who have been thrust out of their homes as penniless refugees, because of some territorial transfer.

FREER ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION

The maintenance of political and cultural self-determination can be reconciled with the building up of larger economic units, on a basis of voluntary association. The creation of such units is a necessity if poverty, unemployment and the consequent mood of seeking salvation in a dictator are to be avoided.

The old Austro-Hungarian Empire, with all its political faults, was a well balanced economic unit. With the exception of Czechoslovakia, the richest part of the former Austria-Hungary, the regions that were torn asunder after the breakdown of the Empire all suffered more or less from the process of fragmentation and the emergence of many new currencies and customs frontiers. Vienna, for instance, became a head without a body, a city of two millions as the capital of a small mountainous peasant republic, with a population of about seven million. Trieste and Fiume, prosperous ports when they were contained with their hinterland in a common customs and cur-

rency system, limped along with difficulty when they were taken over by Italy, a country which was sometimes on bad terms with the Slav hinterland of the two ports.

The overwhelming majority of the people in the valley of the Danube are opposed to a return of the Hapsburgs. But it would be a good omen for the economic wellbeing, and hence for the stability and peace of this part of Europe if the peoples of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire, under their own elected governments, could form a customs and currency union that would make possible a freer circulation of goods, a more rational organization of industry and transportation.

This principle of regional economic federalism could be advantageously applied to other parts of Europe. In time these regional federations might evolve into a United States of Europe. In the growth of a common European consciousness may lie one of the most effective preventives of any new relapse into the fratricidal nationalism that has so often, over a period of centuries, drenched Europe in blood, that now threatens the old continent with almost literal physical obliteration, as weapons become inevitably more and more destructive.

ENCOURAGEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

There has already been abundant experience in Italy of the undesirable consequences of trying to rule a former Axis country by means of a puppet regime with little or no basis in popular support. During a period of actual fighting or of military occupation local civil administration must, of course, be subordinated to the military authorities. But the aim should be to establish responsible self-government in Germany, as in Italy, as rapidly as possible.

At a time when there are widespread indications of discontent with colonial status among the more advanced peoples of Asia it seems fantastic to believe that a large European people can be governed on a colonial basis by foreign conquerors over any very long period of time. Foreign military rule will tend to remove the sense of responsibility, to strengthen the appeal of underground Nazi and Fascist agitators. And the development of aviation makes feasible an invisible and relatively in-

expensive, but very effective means of providing sanctions against rearmament or other breaches of the peace settlement.

It would be impossible to draw up a blueprint of a type of government suitable to all peoples and equally impossible to make such a type of government work by imposing it with the aid of foreign bayonets. The aim should be that every future European government should be reasonably representative of the people concerned, and that certain elementary standards of personal and civil liberty should be commonly accepted and put into effect.

FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS

The formidable excesses of militarism are only possible under regimes where there is no freedom of speech and press. No people, confronted by the figurative choice between guns and butter, has chosen guns when it possessed any freedom of choice. The existence of civil and personal liberties is, therefore, not an exclusive internal concern of the nation concerned. It is a very important guaranty against the coming of a third world war.

This is perhaps especially true as regards freedom of the press, and of radio communication. It is difficult for one who is accustomed to freedom of the press and of public discussion to imagine the monstrous distortions of fact which can be passed off for truth when every source of information is controlled by the government. A free press makes for peace, a controlled press for war.

It would also be a long step forward toward genuine understanding between nations if censorship of the news despatches of foreign correspondents could be eliminated by mutual agreement. Such censorship is designed, of course, to create a favorable impression of the regime which imposes it by suppressing the sending out of critical news and comment. But this objective is never realized. It is the countries that dispense with censorship that generally enjoy the best press abroad and that have the least reason to complain of sensational hostile reports.

FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

No peace settlement is likely to be more than a truce of ex-

haustion unless there is a serious attempt, by co-operative international action, to remove or alleviate some of the strains and stresses in the economic field that became especially pronounced during the interval between the two world wars. Europe was able to maintain an increasing population with a rising standard of living during the nineteenth century not only because of the progress of science and invention, but because there was reasonably free movement for men and goods across frontiers.

Population pressure was relieved because men who could not find adequate opportunity in the Old World could strike out and find new homes across the Atlantic or, to a lesser extent, in the temperate parts of Africa and Oceania. And in a period when tariffs were comparatively low and quotas and other ingenious designs for the restriction of international trade were unknown, physical possession of colonies and of natural resources was of minor importance.

Between the two great wars of our time the trend was, in the main, in an opposite direction. Restrictions on trade and migration multiplied. Problems of population pressure that in former times might have been solved by peaceful movement from the overcrowded countries to the less thickly populated, swelled into factors making for war.

Complete freedom of trade and migration for permanent settlement throughout the world must be ruled out as impracticable at the present time. Differences in national standards of living are so sharp that any such drastic experiment would create more dislocations and difficulties and antagonisms than it would solve.

But it will be a bad omen for future peace if nations or even regional areas after the war shut themselves up in isolated watertight economic compartments. The sense of contrast between the more favored and less favored nations will become more acute; the pressures that helped to bring on the plunge into totalitarian methods, political and economic, in Germany, Italy and some smaller countries will be intensified. What is needed is an all-around effort to lower trade barriers, when these cannot be removed altogether, and to promote schemes of orderly resettlement for regions of the world which are

overcrowded in relation to their food supply and natural resources.

It is one of the ironical paradoxes of our time that, while men can fly around the world with unprecedented speed, the movement of travellers and ideas from country to country is more impeded by ideological controls and censorship methods than it was thirty years ago, on the eve of the outbreak of the First World War. The free interchange of ideas, the easy correspondence between intellectual leaders in various countries was a tremendous humanizing influence that tended to bring the peoples of the world closer together. This important asset for peace and international understanding should be regained as rapidly as possible after the end of the war.

The program of action that has been outlined in the foregoing pages may be criticized as too ambitious. But Europe has reached such a crisis in its destiny that nothing which is not ambitious has much prospect of working at all.

THE FUTURE OF EUROPE

It is a fact of great significance, the full implications of which have perhaps not yet been realized, that Europe's destiny at the end of the present war will be in the hands of extra-European powers, the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union. Geographically, to be sure, it may be argued that the Soviet Union, although most of its territory lies in Asia, belongs to Europe.

But the Bolshevik Revolution and the new political, economic and social institutions which have grown out of it, have created a profound cleavage between Russia and Europe. Making every allowance for the effect of moderate and even conservative changes in Russia in such fields as nationalism, the official attitude toward religion and the family, the countries of the Soviet Union seem to fall into a special category, bound together by ideas and experiences that have not fallen to the lot of other lands.

If one considers as Europe the area lying between the western frontier of the Soviet Union and the Atlantic Ocean, this vast region, inhabited by some 350,000,000 people, will be reduced

by the end of the war to a state of unprecedented physical misery and political impotence. Not a single European great power will be counted among the victors.

This is in striking contrast to the situation in 1918, when two European major powers, France and Italy, were among the Allies and when a larger part of Europe, including Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands, had escaped involvement in the conflict. For another historical parallel one might look to the end of the Napoleonic Wars. But Austria and Prussia figured in the settlement at that time, and France was given much milder treatment than seems likely to be accorded to Germany after the present war.

The political obliteration of Europe was far less complete after the Napoleonic upheaval than it will be after the downfall of Hitlerite Germany. Then, temporarily at least, the political, military and economic strength of every other continental large power except Russia will have been destroyed. In contrast to 1914-18, when France remained in possession of most of its territory and the sovereign authority of the French Government on its own soil was unchallenged, the liberation of France must now be largely the work of foreign armies and the status of the Committee of National Liberation remains somewhat equivocal.

Even more dubious is the prospect for re-emergence as an independent state of the largest country in Eastern Europe, Poland. First partitioned between its two powerful neighbors, Germany and the Soviet Union, Poland subsequently, just as in the last war, became a battleground of the German and Russian armies. In this age of mechanized warfare the heroic Polish underground could play only a minor part in determining the physical control of its country. While the entire East European situation is highly fluid at the time of writing, it seems doubtful whether Poland can hope to achieve as much national independence as it gained after the last war, when Germany and Russia were knocked out, for different reasons, at the same time.

There is something symbolic in the names of the cities where the political and military strategy of the war has been worked

out: Casablanca, Quebec, Moscow, Cairo, Teheran. Not a European name among them.

There are other symbols of the decline of Europe, in relation to other continents. There is the long list of distinguished European intellectuals who have sought refuge, and in some cases permanent citizenship, outside of Europe. It would be sobering and revealing if one could project through a film contrasted pictures of life in 1914, before the First World War, and in 1944 in half a dozen great European cities, Paris, Rome, Berlin, Warsaw, Cologne, Brussels. The devastation and deterioration of the present year would suggest one of the most catastrophic periods in the decline and fall of the Roman Empire. And it may be that the supreme climactic agonies of the present conflict have not yet occurred.

Yet it would be premature and defeatist to assume that Europe has fallen into a permanent state of decay and degeneration. Three hundred and fifty million people, most of them belonging to nations which have made distinguished contributions to arts and letters, science and invention, cannot be summarily written off.

The dominant position which the extra-European powers will occupy in relation to that continent after the end of the war creates temptations and imposes responsibilities. Obviously a position of leadership will belong to the strongest of the United Nations, the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain after the overthrow of German military power.

But these countries should act as leaders, not dictators, as trustees, not tyrants. Broadly speaking one can imagine two policies that might be pursued in relation to Europe. The first would think in terms of revenge, of exclusive alliances, of spheres of influence and balance of power politics. The second would make justice, not revenge the dominant element in the settlement and would aim at a peace based on general principles of equity equally applicable to "all the men in all the lands," to quote the phraseology of the Atlantic Charter. Every consideration of sound national interest should impel the United States to cast the weight of its international influence behind the second type of settlement.

II. EFFECTS OF THE WAR

The effects of the second great war that has been fought on European soil within a generation have been materially more devastating than those of the first. Economically the changes have been greater. The psychological effects of this Second World War are still a matter of debate and conjecture. Only after the fall of the Nazi regime will it be possible to obtain some idea of what political and social desires are uppermost in the minds of the European peoples. And these desires will be strongly affected, as to their realization, by the circumstances of postwar military occupation. It will probably make a considerable difference, for instance, whether an area falls under Anglo-American or Soviet military control. Temporarily at least, the occupying power will exercise a good deal of influence on the make-up of the local administration.

PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION

Physical destruction in the last war was appalling in spots, but was mainly restricted to battle and campaign areas, such as the northeastern departments of France, some regions in Poland and Galicia and the territory over which the Austro-Hungarian and Italian armies fought. Bombing from airplanes and Zeppelins was a nuisance, rather than a serious military weapon.

The first campaigns of the present war were so overwhelmingly onesided that comparatively little permanent destruction was wrought, despite the bombings of individual cities, such as Warsaw, Rotterdam and Belgrade. The Allied invasion of the Italian peninsula north of Naples was a slow, methodical advance in the face of stubborn German resistance, and a considerable amount of destruction could not be avoided. At the moment of writing one of the world's great treasuries of art, the city of Florence, seems to have suffered some damage and to be in imminent danger of further destruction. The towns of Normandy were pretty badly battered during the slow pace of the invasion during its first weeks.

But what has made this war infinitely more destructive than

its predecessor is the tremendous expansion of the air weapon. England was the first country that felt the full fury of the modern Blitz. What London, Coventry, Plymouth, Bristol and other British objectives suffered has been requited perhaps twentyfold on German industrial and communication centres and ports since the balance in air power shifted definitely to the side of the United Nations.

The Germans, especially in the larger towns, were desperately hungry by the autumn of 1918. This was an important reason for the decision to give up the struggle while German armies were still fighting on foreign soil.

Probably the 1918 condition of hunger has not been duplicated in Germany at the present time. Rationing has been in effect since the beginning of the war, whereas it was introduced as an improvised measure after food reserves had been largely exhausted in the last war. The area which German armies have controlled and which could be systematically pillaged of provisions for the benefit of Germany is larger. Agricultural pro-

ductivity is higher.

But the plight of the German cities, with the exception of a few that have escaped the hard blows of air warfare, is worse than it was at the end of the last war. Then residential areas and industrial plants were intact, apart from neglect because of the concentration on war output. Now many of the largest and most famous German cities, Berlin, Hamburg, Cologne, Nuernberg, Duesseldorf, have been almost literally laid waste. The full amount of destruction cannot be measured accurately until the end of the war. But, when one has made all reasonable allowance for the exaggerated claims that are sometimes made on behalf of air warfare, when one considers that a good deal of production and transportation activity must have been kept up in order to supply three major fighting fronts, there can be little doubt that the casualties of air warfare in Germany are to be numbered in hundreds of thousands and the homeless in millions.

To a lesser extent towns in occupied countries have also suffered because of the attempt to strike at German war production and communication centres. And a large part of Euro-

[16]

pean Russia west of a line running from Leningrad through Moscow to Stalingrad has been reduced to desolation as a result first of Russian, then of German "scorched earth" tactics during retreats. In large parts of Europe and in the more exposed areas of Great Britain a gigantic rehousing program will certainly be one of the first essential tasks of rehabilitation.

DISPLACEMENT OF POPULATIONS

The present war far exceeds its predecessor in the number of human beings who have been violently uprooted. Air bombings have made an increasing number of people entirely destitute. It has been reported that in Germany a new line of social cleavage is developing between those who have been bombed out and those who have not.

An unprecedented situation has been created in Germany by the tremendous mobilization of foreigners for work in war plants and on farms. There is general agreement as to the polyglot character of many German towns as a result of the

influx of these foreigners, some of whom are war prisoners, others are deportees, while still another group, composed of skilled workers from the West European country, has been more or less voluntarily recruited by offers of high pay and family benefits. The repatriation of these workers will be one of the most urgent and one of the most difficult of the postwar problems. The nearest parallel to this situation in the last war was the plight of some two million Russian war prisoners in Germany and Austria. The most moderate estimates of the number of foreign laborers in Germany are far above this figure.

THE FOOD PROBLEM

Since the beginning of the war the part of the European continent under German control has been in a state of economic siege because of the British blockade. While the German people have apparently been receiving an adequate, although uninteresting diet and there has been no lack of foodstuffs, including even luxuries like raisins, oranges and chocolate, for the picked military units, the blockade, combined with the dis-

[17]

ruption of the war, has pressed with varying degrees of severity on the countries of Europe.

Conditions were worst in Greece, a land that is not self-sufficient in food in normal times and that depends on its exports and its carrying trade to feed itself. Outright starvation prevailed in Athens and other large towns until there was a relaxation of the blockade and foreign supplies, under Red Cross supervision, were permitted to be sent into Greece. This has at least alleviated what had been a tragic situation and there has been official American and British recognition of the fact that there has been no diversion of these relief supplies to German military uses.

Conditions in other parts of Europe have varied and a full and trustworthy picture can only be obtained after the end of the war. Normandy was better supplied with food than had been expected. But this had always been one of the richest agricultural regions of France, and the French peasant is skillful in evading distasteful requisitions.

Dr. Howard Kershner, who was in charge of relief work in

DR. HOWARD REISNER, who was in charge of relief work in Southern France for the American Friends Service Committee, has given detailed testimony as to deplorable malnutrition in this part of France, especially in some of the larger towns, such as Marseilles. There has also been French official testimony as to the increased incidence of tuberculosis and mortality among children.

Densely populated, industrialized Belgium has suffered acutely, and this is also true as regards Norway. Except in the case of Greece, there is little conclusive evidence that the situation has reached the intensity of a Chinese or Indian famine, with vast numbers of people literally dying of starvation.

But even the more fortunate parts of Europe, even neutral powers, such as Sweden and Switzerland, have been obliged to tighten their belts continually. There is unfortunately little reason to doubt that the UNRRA and other relief agencies will be faced with a general condition of malnutrition and its inevitable consequence, stunted bodies and nervous and psychological disorders, among the peoples whose lot has been the hardest during the war.

[18]

DISRUPTION OF THE INDUSTRIAL ECONOMY

Europe is a closely settled continent, with much greater pressure of population on the available means of subsistence than one would find in the Americas. The standard of living which it possessed before the war was the product of a complicated system of trade and exchange, both within Europe and with other parts of the world.

The blockade cut off Europe from Asia, Africa and the Americas. And inter-European trade has, of course, been subordinated to the exigencies of war. Land communication has necessarily been substituted for the cheaper and more convenient use of waterways.

Whatever technical advantages might be gained by the economic unification of Europe have been offset overwhelmingly by the conditions of blockade and of persistent air bombardment under which the European economy has been functioning.

This European economy has been subjected to control and exploitation from Berlin. In the first years of the war the Nazi leaders seem to have seriously considered the idea of making Germany the industrial heart of Europe, concentrating heavy

industries there, while reducing France and other countries to the status of foodstuffs and centres of luxury trade. Some cases of transfer of factory machinery and equipment to Germany were reported.

But the intensified pounding of German industrial centres in the further course of the war seems to have led to an alteration of this scheme. Dispersal, rather than concentration, has become the German industrial objective. As the Ruhr and the Rhineland were more and more heavily bombed there seems to have been a tendency to transfer war production, so far as circumstances permit, to more eastern regions, to Silesia, Austria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. A situation may arise in which Germany will find some of its industrial plants located outside the frontiers which will be assigned to the Reich after the peace settlement.

A development that was not paralleled during the other war, and that may produce important social and economic conse-

[19]

quences, is the tremendous scrambling of property titles in business enterprises, especially in France. An exorbitant levy in francs for the maintenance of the German forces of occupation has been imposed in France and paid in francs. The francs which were not used for the needs of the troops have been applied, in many cases, to buying German control of French enterprises.

This was part of a general Nazi scheme to acquire German economic hegemony in Europe, but with a minimum disruption of production and a maximum observance of legal forms. That the governments of the occupied countries will repudiate these deals may be taken for granted. But the restoration of property to the original owners may prove to be such a complicated task that an impetus will be given to movements in favor of nationalization and socialization.

BREAKDOWN OF RESPECT FOR LAW AND ORDER

There are numerous reports that the traditional honesty of the German civil service has broken down to a considerable extent under the Nazi regime. Corruption and black markets are rampant. Almost anything can be had for money, from rare

luxuries like coffee and champagne to the still more valuable identification papers. This prevalent corruption facilitates the work of the underground movements, especially in France and Poland, and helps to explain the large proportion of aviators, shot down over occupied countries, who find their way back to England.

Some difficult moral, psychological and economic problems have been prepared for the future by the ordeal of Nazi domination of the European continent under the aggravating conditions of war and blockade. The great majority of the people, especially in the occupied countries, regard it as meritorious to break and evade the regulations issued by the Nazis and the puppet governments. But it may be difficult to discard this psychology when authority returns to legitimate and popularly elected governments.

The habits of guerrilla warfare may also be difficult to discard, especially in the traditionally wilder countries of Eastern

[20]

Europe. It is unfortunate, but unmistakably true that in some cases internal local feuds are as fierce as the hostility between the people of the occupied countries and the Germans. Serbo-Croat antagonism has caused much bloodshed in Yugoslavia and may be an insuperable obstacle to the re-emergence of a Yugoslav state of the pre-war type.

The issue as between Communists and nationalists may well be acute in Poland and in other countries bordering on the Soviet Union. Men who have been accustomed to fighting in partisan bands in the mountains and forests may instinctively reach for arms again if they feel that their hopes and demands after the war are being thwarted.

After such an agonizing ordeal and such a vast upheaval it would be unreasonable to expect that life in Europe would return quickly and easily to normal conditions. Many racial, national and social clashes loom on the horizon, even though exhaustion after the years of war and foreign military occupation may impose a surface calm.

POLITICAL UNCERTAINTIES

It is sobering to recall that the true victors of the First World War were not the statesmen of the Allied powers. They were three revolutionaries, little known even in their own countries before their rise to power. The names of these revolutionaries were Lenin, Hitler and Mussolini. There will almost certainly be unpredictable surprises in more than one European country after the end of the war.

This is all the more true because public opinion, even in democratic countries, is to some extent blanketed by a fog of censorship and war propaganda. When this fog lifts it may well be discovered that some movements and trends are stronger, others are weaker than has been generally believed.

It is perhaps a safe generalization to anticipate that return to regimes that will be widely recognized as legitimate will be easier in Western and Northern Europe than in Eastern Europe and in the Balkans, or in former Axis countries. There much fiercer passions have been unloosed and there are fewer con-

[21]

stitutional principles and habits of orderly self-government to serve as an underpinning for a return to stability.

There is not sufficient data to permit any certain judgment as to the moods and desires of the peoples who have been living inside Hitler's so-called European fortress. The methods and the degree of resistance have varied, depending on geographic conditions. The guerrilla warfare that is possible in the mountains of Yugoslavia or the forests of Poland would not be feasible in the more open country of Western Europe. Here the underground movement has been compelled, in the main, to restrict itself to more limited objectives: individual acts of terrorism and sabotage, printing of newspapers, organized assistance to United Nations airmen and secret agents. Only in the later phase of the war, under the pressure of the labor draft and the stimulus of the invasion, was the French underground movement able to carry out actions of mass revolt.

Apart from a general desire to drive out the Germans, there is little evidence of agreement as to future political and economic programs among the leaders and members of the underground resistance movements. It may be assumed that some, if not all the pre-war political parties and groups will reappear.

But these parties will be functioning against a background

of impoverishment and permanent economic crisis in which the situation will most probably demand the grant of wide executive powers to the government and a minimum of merely obstructionist criticism. If there is a case for the continuance of some wartime controls in the United States and Canada to avert inflation and a wild scramble for goods in the immediate postwar period, much stronger controls will probably be necessary in European lands where the provision of elementary necessities in food, clothing and shelter will tax the resources of governments until there can be some restoration of production and trade.

Some observers foresee a strong swing to the Left on the European continent after the war. The very destructiveness of the war is an unmistakable revolutionizing agency. A continent accustomed to mass deportations and expropriations may well

be less tender in relation to the rights of private property than countries which have felt the impact of the conflict less directly.

The propertied classes have been under more temptation to collaborate with the Nazis; and this may furnish material for radical agitation. If one looks back to the aftermath of the last war one recalls the widespread movements of revolt in the countries that had been defeated or that had suffered most in the war: the Russian Bolshevik Revolution; the succession of sporadic outbreaks in Germany; the shortlived Soviet regimes in Bavaria and Hungary; the many strikes and abortive riots.

Yet there are considerations that weigh in the balance on the other side. The Nazi-controlled European economy has carried state regulation to extreme lengths. It is doubtful whether there will be a desire to perpetuate this system any longer than urgent reconstruction needs demand.

Much of the unrest after the last war could be attributed directly or indirectly to the influence of Soviet communism, then in a zealous missionary phase of development. For the warweary, hungry, exhausted masses of Central and Eastern Europe communism possessed the fascination of a new untried experiment. Now this fascination has disappeared. The outlines of the new order in Russia are fairly clear. And it is doubtful whether many European peoples, however much they might wish to realize internal reforms, would desire a precise duplication of the Soviet political and economic setup.

All speculation about the mood of the peoples who are now held down by German military rule is necessarily conjectural. But it is interesting and perhaps significant to note that Polish soldiers in the Soviet Union who were interviewed by American correspondents generally professed a desire to live in Po-

can correspondents generally professed a desire to live in Poland, not in the Soviet Union, even if their homes should pass under Soviet rule as a result of boundary changes.

The Soviet Union will possess great political and military power and the prestige that is associated with its successful stand against the German war machine. But communism as a banner of revolt will be less effective than was the case in 1919 and 1920. It is perhaps a realistic appraisal of this fact that accounts for the moderation of Stalin's pronouncements on the

[23]

subject of international revolution, and for his professed willingness to leave unchanged social and economic institutions outside the territory which he has marked for annexation to the Soviet Union.

A mood that may be quite prevalent after the war, especially in the defeated countries, is cynical apathy. Observers have found traces of this in Italy. To some extent the overcoming of this trend will be an internal problem. But America and the United Nations can help by making territorial settlements as speedy and as fair, in terms of national self-determination, as possible and by ruling out impossible economic demands that would involve slavery for future generations.

III. PIVOTAL GERMANY

Geography, economics and population tend to make Germany a pivotal factor in the future of Europe. Germany is located in the heart of the continent. It is far and away the most highly developed European state industrially. The Ruhr area alone, so often the target of United Nations bombing airplanes, is one of the most industrialized areas in the world, with its complex of coal-mines, iron and steel works, chemical factories, all closely linked up by an extremely thick network of railways.

Leaving war losses out of account, the Germans are the most numerous people in Europe outside of the Soviet Union. There were about eighty million Germans before the outbreak of hostilities, sixty-seven million in the Reich, between six and seven million in Austria, a little over three million in the Sudeten districts of Czechoslovakia and the remainder widely scattered from the Italian Tyrol to the German colonies on the Volga in

from the Italian Tyrol to the German colonies on the Volga, in the Soviet Union.

So the German problem is an inseparable part of the European problem. No matter how much horror the crimes of the Nazis may arouse, it is difficult to conceive of a permanent and stable European order into which a peaceable Germany has not been integrated.

[24]

EUROPE AFTER WORLD WAR I



From War Atlas, Headline Series, Foreign Policy Association

GERMANY AND RUSSIA

After the last war there was a struggle between Western and Eastern influences in Germany. Not only the German Communists who emerged from the left wing of the German Social Democratic Party, but also some extreme nationalists favored a close tie-up between Germany and revolutionary Russia. It is easy to imagine how different the history of Europe would have been if this aspiration had been realized, if a Soviet Germany had stood side by side with Soviet Russia. Such a combination would have almost certainly engulfed all the small and medium sized states between the German and Russian ethnic frontiers and would have confronted the victorious Allies of the last war with a gigantic bloc stretching from the Pacific to the North Sea.

But the German extremists were defeated. Social and economic conditions and national psychology in Germany were unfavorable to revolution on the Russian Soviet model. The Weimar Republic won through to victory over the disorders and economic difficulties of the first postwar years, only to fall under the double impact of the world crisis and the rising Hitler movement in the early thirties.

The spectre of German-Soviet co-operation appeared again with the signing of the pact of non-aggression between the two countries on August 23, 1939. By virtue of this pact Hitler obtained a free hand against Poland, and against France and England in the West, while Stalin was able to annex Eastern Poland and the Baltic States. But Hitler's unlimited ambition destroyed this agreement and precipitated Germany and the Soviet Union into the most gigantic land war of history in June, 1941.

WERE THE GERMAN PEOPLE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE WAR?

By the summer of 1944 the possibility of a German military victory seemed to have disappeared. The Anglo-American-

Soviet coalition disposed of overwhelming superiority in manpower, munitions and supplies. Germany had been thrown on the defensive on every front. The time and the cost of complete victory were still uncertain. But the victory itself seemed reasonably certain. So the question of "what to do with Germany,"

[26]

which might well have seemed academic in the first years of the war, began to assume practical importance.

Subsequent impartial research tended to disprove the propagandist theory of Germany's sole responsibility for the outbreak of the First World War. But there could be little argument as to Hitler's responsibility for the Second World War. The attack on Poland was premeditated and carefully planned. And this was only the climax of a series of aggressive acts, carried out by force and threat of force, which had kept Europe in a state of fear and turmoil. The annexation of Austria and of the Sudeten area of Czechoslovakia and the seizure of Memel from Lithuania were in this category.

A question that has aroused more discussion is how far the German people have supported Hitler in his militarist adventure. As is always the case when a people lives under totalitarian rule, the answer is somewhat complex. It is hard for the citizen of a democratic country to realize how hopeless the task of resistance seems under such a type of government, and what a rare combination of physical and moral courage is required to engage in active opposition.

On the one hand a totalitarian regime creates an impression of crushing and formidable unity by its intensive press and radio propaganda, by its huge public demonstrations. The individual is reduced to a sense of nothingness in the presence of this powerfully organized mass.

This element of organization and propaganda is reinforced by a terrorism that is at once brutal and subtle. The individual does not obtain the satisfaction of hurling defiance at the hated regime in the course of a public trial. He is shot in gangster style without trial or he may be slowly tortured to death in a concentration camp.

The old-fashioned traditional autocracy or military dictatorship seems amateurish and even humane by comparison with

the streamlined brutality of the modern totalitarian state. Its eyes and ears are everywhere. Because youth is susceptible to indoctrination with fanatical ideas, parents are not infrequently denounced by their children for supposedly disloyal acts. The existence of branches of the ruling party in every factory, every

[27]

office, every village makes the organization of any mass underground movement so difficult as to be almost impossible.

An anecdote has been told in more than one totalitarian capital helps to illustrate the totalitarian technique. According to the story, the dictator seeks relaxation by going to a moving-picture performance incognito. His own picture is thrown on the screen and the whole audience rises to applaud. The dictator himself remains seated. The man next to him leans over and remarks very solicitously:

"Many of us feel just as you do and we have all the sympathy in the world with you. But—it would be much safer for you to get up and join in the applause."

So far as one can judge from the results of the last relatively free election in Germany, in March, 1933, about half the German people at that time favored Hitler's rise to power. Since that time there has been no means for testing public opinion. It is hard to know what has been the relative weight of indoctrination in the Nazi-controlled schools and youth organizations, on one side, and the hard experiences of a war that has been taking an ever greater toll of lives and destruction, on the other.

War is seldom conducive to clear and objective thinking about enemy countries. There is a tendency in some quarters to adopt toward the Germans as a people the same attitude of indiscriminating reprobation that has been characteristic of the Nazi attitude toward the Jews. Several historical fallacies are in danger of being widely accepted and of leading to a mistaken conception of the elements of a lasting peace settlement.

WAS GERMANY HISTORICALLY AGGRESSIVE?

One of these fallacies is the frequently repeated assertion that the Germans since the beginning of their historical existence have been incorrigible aggressors. A very elementary knowledge of European history should dispose of this fallacy.

...message of European history should dispose of the enemy.
There were long periods of time when Germany was the punching bag of Europe. French, Swedish and other foreign troops overran Germany during the protracted agony of the

[28]

Thirty Years War. Germany was the object, not the initiator of aggression in the time of Louis XIV and Napoleon.

What can be truthfully said is that under the prevalent system of international anarchy the strongest power in Europe has invariably yielded to the temptation to abuse its strength. For a time this role belonged to Spain. Then it passed to France; more recently it has belonged to Germany. The moral would seem to be that the true guaranty of peace is to organize a genuine international order, capable of preventing all acts of aggression, not to aim at the political or economic destruction of a single nation.

ARE GERMANS PLANNING WORLD WAR III?

Another fallacy is that from the moment when the last shot was fired in 1918, all Germans united to prepare another conflict. During the twenties anti-war sentiment in Germany was as strong as in any other country that had experienced the misery of the last war. Erich Maria Remarque's "All Quiet on The Western Front" reflected a widespread mood among his countrymen, with its superbly realistic depiction of the mingled heroism and fellowship, brutality and filth, and ultimate futility of trench warfare.

Even after Hitler came into power, he found it expedient to mask his aggressive designs behind a pretense of desire for peace with foreign nations. This was partly a concession to the psychology of the German people. There is general agreement among foreign observers in Germany during the first period of the war that there were no signs of popular enthusiasm, that even the spectacularly rapid overrunning of France in 1940 elicited an apathetic response from the civilian population.

Closely linked with this fallacy that all Germans, irrespective of party and class, thirsted for another world conflict, is the dogmatic assertion that Germany will "try it again." It may, of course, be taken for granted that there will be some Nazi and nationalist fanatics who will escape from the crash and will never give up hope for a new war of revenge. But unless the peace settlement is so bad as to drive all Germans to a sense

of desperation there is little reason to believe that such men

[29]

will win an enthusiastic hearing from a people of whom many will be mourning the last male members of their families, while others will have been reduced to utter poverty by air bombing.

Historical experience shows that the possession of superior power is the usual prelude to aggression. It seems improbable that Germany, after a second defeat, which will certainly involve sterner consequences than the first, will be in a position of commanding power.

IS DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT IN GERMANY POSSIBLE?

Another fallacy is that the fall of the Weimar Republic reveals a congenital inability of Germans to govern themselves. Here there is a tendency to overlook both the constructive achievements of the Republic and the tremendous difficulties which it confronted.

Germany under the Republic was a civilized, well governed country. Its record in such fields as respect for personal and civil liberties and progressive labor legislation compared favorably with that of any country east of the Rhine. There was healthy expression for regional diversity. A large city with a majority of industrial workers would usually have a Social Democratic municipal administration. A predominantly Catholic peasant country like Bavaria would have a suitably representative local government.

Of course the Republic suffered from faults and weaknesses. It was too gentle with reactionary groups which were bent on sabotage. It failed to capture the imagination of the younger generation with positive affirmative programs and slogans. The multiplicity of parties led to a loosening of the sense of responsibility in government. But how infinitely happier Germany and Europe and the world would have been if the Republic had maintained itself! And some of the causes of its fall cannot be fairly laid to the account of the German Republicans.

The prodigious economic crisis of the late twenties and early thirties hit Germany especially hard, because it was the most highly industrialized country in Europe, and because much of its capital had been destroyed by the inflation. The tendency among the unemployed to demand violent action, to drift into

the ranks of the Nazis was strong. The pressure of these impersonal forces was strengthened by the palace intrigues that induced the aged Hindenburg to overcome his original distaste for Hitler, and invite him to become Chancellor.

The Weimar Republic failed. But when one recalls the many vicissitudes and setbacks, lasting for almost a century, before France acquired a stable democratic form of government under the Third Republic it would seem premature to rule out as impossible a democratic evolution in Germany. Certainly the most hopeful guaranty for European peace and stability would lie in the establishment after the war of a representative republican government. There would be little basis for hope and satisfaction if Germany should fall under a Communist type of totalitarian rule, or should set up a disguised dictatorship of Junkers and big industrialists.

To state that the emergence of a postwar republican government in Germany would be the most desirable solution is not to minimize the difficulties that obstruct the realization of this ideal. At the end of the last war there were three parties, the Social Democrats, the Centre, or Catholic Party, the Democrats, which, swelling in numbers under the influence of defeat, could furnish the organized popular support for a republican regime.

Now Germany has lived under eleven years of totalitarian rule. Many of the prominent leaders of the former republican parties are dead or in exile, cut off from their country. The membership has been terrorized, compelled, to a large extent, to merge itself in the mass of Germans who outwardly profess loyalty to the Nazi regime. And the experience in Italy indicates that it is a matter of time and difficulty to reconstruct parties which have been silenced and pulverized during a long period of totalitarian rule.

It has been an understandable Nazi policy to try to identify the German people with the Hitler regime, to convince the former that they are in the same boat with their rulers, that they must sink or swim together. Certain methods of warfare and certain features of United Nations policy have tended, perhaps unconsciously, to facilitate this Nazi objective.

The general weight of testimony about the effect of air bombing is that, however effective it may have been from a technical military standpoint, it has stiffened, rather than broken German civilian morale. People are drawn together, just as they were formerly in England, in elementary tasks of rescue, firefighting, refugee relief.

The refusal of the United Nations Governments to amplify the phrase "unconditional surrender" and the specific repudiation, by Prime Minister Churchill, of any obligation to apply the Atlantic Charter to Germany, despite the universal character of its phrasing, have also furnished welcome material for Nazi propaganda. These points are used to persuade the German people that the only alternative to lastditch continuation of the war is national extinction and literal slavery. In this connection the proposal of the Soviet economist Varga that large numbers of Germans be forced to labor for an indefinite period of time on the restoration of destroyed Russian towns has also not passed unnoticed in Germany.

A genuine anti-Nazi republican government in Germany would acknowledge moral liabilities for the whole German people, in view of the many crimes committed by the Nazi regime. It would undertake to punish war criminals, to restore loot, to make good damage, so far as this was economically feasible.

But honest and patriotic German republicans could not be expected to assume responsibility for some of the more extreme proposals which have been put forward for the treatment of Germany after the war, for the amputation of indisputably German regions, for the carrying off of large numbers of Germans, irrespective of individual guilt, into slavery, for the industrial dismantlement of a country that could not support its population without a high level of factory output. Renegade former Nazis might be expected to co-operate in such policies, but not men and women who risked their lives, not to destroy their country, but to regenerate it and save it from Nazi tyranny.

PROPOSALS FOR BREAKING UP GERMANY

Unfortunately it now seems highly probable that the peace

settlement will include serious violations of the principle of self-determination. The Soviet Government has committed itself to the annexation of something over 40% of the area of pre-war Poland, an area in which the racial composition of the population is mixed.

The Committee of National Liberation, a Soviet-dominated Polish organization that was called into existence after the Soviet troops had crossed the Bug River (the line which separates the part of Poland which Stalin desires to annex from the part which, at least nominally, will remain independent), has called for the annexation by Poland of territory up to the line of the Oder River. This would imply the annexation by Poland of East Prussia and of parts of Brandenburg and Silesia.

From the shortsighted standpoint of power politics this assignment to Poland of regions with an overwhelmingly German population as "compensation" for the loss of its eastern provinces may seem clever. It is calculated to bring Poland into a state of permanent dependence on the Soviet Union in order to maintain these acquisitions.

But from the standpoint of longrange peace such an artificial redrawing of boundary lines seems very unpromising. A country is weakened, rather than strengthened, by the annexation of territory to which it has no ethnographic claim. Should the German population of the areas affected remain within the Polish frontier, it would be a constant source of difficulty. Should it be uprooted and deported and thrown penniless into an already overcrowded Reich, an army of new recruits for underground Nazi movements would be provided.

Equally unsound are proposals to turn over the Rhineland, the Ruhr to France or to break up the remainder of Germany into three or more separate states. It would be desirable, in Germany's own interest, that the excessive centralization of the Nazi political administration should be modified, that the post-war Germany should be organized on a federal basis. But an artificial separatism, enforced by foreign bayonets, would possess little element of permanence. It would run counter to modern economic tendencies. It would give all Germans an immediate objective: to regain their lost unity.

There is an element both of desperation and of shortsightedness about many of these schemes for dismembering Germany. For the sake not so much of the German people as of the future wellbeing and stability of Europe unnatural frontiers and the placing of large numbers of people under alien rule should be avoided.

It is often overlooked that the Second World War could never have started if Great Britain and France had not let the effective preventive measure, the disarmament provision of the Treaty of Versailles, slip out of their possession without a struggle. The development of air power provides a new, swift and terrible sanction for violations of future disarmament measures. What, then, is the justification for reverting to eighteenth century methods of handing people about as if they were cattle?

PUNISHMENT OF WAR CRIMINALS

The background and the course of the present war have raised two issues of great delicacy and complexity. One is the punishment of war criminals. The other is the so-called re-education of Germany.

The ruthlessness of Nazi war methods, especially the mass extermination of Jews, the shooting of innocent hostages, the wiping out of communities, such as Lidice, in Czechoslovakia, have led to a demand, which found formal expression in the tripartite agreement of Moscow, in the autumn of 1943, for the trial and punishment of individuals responsible for these atrocities. In this matter a good deal of discriminating judgment must be shown, if every future war is not to turn into a struggle of desperation and extermination.

All wars have their quotas of atrocities. Public opinion in a belligerent country is naturally much more sensitive to cruelties committed by the enemy than to acts of ruthlessness committed by its own force. The Germans might and probably do regard obliteration bombings and the use of phosphorus shells as atrocities.

A good deal of rough justice will be meted out to Germans who do not get away when the Nazi military grip on occupied

countries is broken. So far as formal trials are carried out, it would seem advisable to restrict these to a comparatively small number of major offenders and to include in the Courts that will pass judgment some qualified German anti-Nazis and representatives of neutral countries. Otherwise the trials may turn into legalized lynchings and criminals may be transformed into national heroes, in the eyes of the German masses.

RE-EDUCATION AND RECONSTRUCTION

Defeat itself will be the most effective agency of re-education. Plans for flooding Germany with United Nations teachers and educational supervisors must be regarded as fantastic and are apparently being abandoned. Only anti-Nazi Germans can carry on any educational effort that will not serve as a boomerang.

Of course there is a good deal that foreign churches, universities and religious and cultural agencies can contribute to the emergence of a new Germany by establishing contact with likeminded groups in Germany. This will be all the more necessary because Germany after defeat will face a yawning political vacuum.

There is every prospect that the struggle will go on this time until Germany is much more exhausted than it was in 1918. The active Nazis who escape will flee abroad or go underground. The most reliable functionaries of the new regime will be members of the former republican parties, together with representatives of the permanent civil service who have not been closely identified with the Nazi regime. The German churches, both Protestant and Catholic, have displayed a good deal of moral fortitude during the crisis they have experienced. The name of Pastor Niemoeller has become internationally famous and some of the pastoral letters of the Catholic Bishops have been worded in terms of amazingly frank criticism, measured by the standards of the totalitarian state.

For thirty years Europe has been living in an atmosphere of war and violent revolution, of terrorism and purges, of which the Nazi regime in Germany is perhaps the last and most ter-

rible example. The temptation after the war to adopt a policy of indiscriminate revenge will be great.

But if there is to be a tolerable future for Europe the emphasis must be on justice, not on revenge, on the future, not on the past, on reconstruction, not on measures that will lead to more chaos and bitterness. It will not be enough to destroy the military power of the Nazi regime. A non-Nazi Germany must be reintegrated with the European society of nations.

IV. EUROPE WEST

Not only geography, but conditions of social and economic development have tended to draw a line of demarcation between Europe West and Europe East. Europe West, understanding by that term Scandinavia and the countries west of the Rhine, was, with the conspicuous exception of Spain, a relatively stable and prosperous region before the outbreak of the war.

Constitutional government functioned regularly, civil and personal liberties were respected, trade and industry helped to raise the standard of living, general literacy was the rule. Europe East, understanding by that term the lands lying between Germany and the Soviet Union, was a more backward area, with some exceptions, such as Czechoslovakia and Finland. In general the countries of Eastern Europe were predominantly agrarian and comparatively poor. Constitutions were often honored in the breach more than in the observance. Methods of administration were traditionally harsh and arbitrary. While social idealism was sometimes linked up with the newly gratified instinct for national self-expression, the amount of progress that proved feasible was sharply limited by the poverty of the area.

GREAT BRITAIN'S POSITION IN THE WEST

To some extent the war has been a levelling agency. Belgium today is almost as hungry as Greece. But the prospects of regional development in Europe West and in Europe East are

prospectively the strongest power in the former area, the Soviet Union in the latter.

There is every reason to believe that British influence will be paramount in the area west of the Rhine and south of the Alps. Soviet armies and political influence will scarcely advance into this region. American contact with Western Europe is much less close and intimate than British. When the war comes to an end, Great Britain will be obliged to cast up a rather mixed balance-sheet. Some assets that formerly belonged to England as the greatest trader and middleman among the large powers will have disappeared or will have been heavily depleted. A large part of Great Britain's foreign investments will have been sacrificed. Canada and India will be on balance creditors, not debtors.

Many of the "invisible" items on the favorable side of England's balance of international payments must be written down. The complicated mechanism of international banking and insurance from which England earned considerable returns cannot be reconstructed overnight. It has been estimated that Great Britain must increase its exports by fifty per cent in order to regain its pre-war standard of living.

Small wonder that British public opinion looks with some concern at the vast growth of American shipping and productive capacity, which may seek an outlet in the development of foreign markets when the demands of war production have ceased. One of the most experienced senior statesmen of the British Empire, Field Marshal Jan Christian Smuts, Prime Minister of South Africa, frankly voiced this concern in a much discussed speech which he delivered toward the end of 1943.

But there is a brighter side to the British picture. The British leaders from the beginning of the war gambled on complete victory. Even when the military outlook was darkest, after the fall of France, Churchill refused all suggestions of a compromise peace. Now this stake on victory is well on the way to being won. Churchill's avowed hope that America would enter the conflict has been realized. An equally fortunate development was Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union, which made pos-

{ 37 }

sible the two-front war that was always the nightmare of German strategists.

No one can foresee what conflicts and difficulties may arise

in the future, especially if the peace settlement is framed by narrow and shortsighted considerations of power politics and there is no effort to eliminate the basic causes of war. But in the immediate postwar period Great Britain will probably be stronger and safer than it was during the uneasy period before the outbreak of hostilities, when German and Japanese strength was growing apace.

BRITISH POLICY IN WESTERN EUROPE

British policy toward the continent will most probably be shaped by an interplay of two considerations: Imperial security and a desire to resume profitable interchange of goods. The desire to keep the Mediterranean a British lake is already reflected in the keen interest with which British diplomacy follows developments in the three strategic peninsulas of Spain, Italy and Greece.

Churchill went out of his way a few months ago to say friendly words about the Franco regime in Spain and has made no secret of his desire to preserve monarchical governments in Italy and Greece. British influence is paramount in the important United Nations military control commission in Italy. It would seem that there has been a provisional delimitation of British and Soviet spheres of influence, Great Britain supporting King George II of Greece with Soviet acquiescence, while at the same time acknowledging the Communist partisan leader, the so-called Marshal Tito, as the leader of Yugoslavian resistance.

Field Marshal Smuts, in the speech which has already been mentioned, advocated closer relations between Great Britain and the democracies of western and northern Europe. This recalls the fact that Churchill, on the eve of the fall of France, made the spectacular offer of a political merging of Great Britain and France, with the establishment of a common citizenship.

Little has been heard of this suggestion, either from British

or French sources, during recent years. It is probable that differences of language, temperament and administrative method rule out a fullfledged political union between Great Britain and France. The same considerations might well prevent coun-

and France. The same considerations might well prevent countries such as Belgium, the Netherlands and Norway from joining the British Commonwealth.

What seems probable almost to the point of certainty is the drawing up of precise and binding military commitments for common action against any revival of German aggression by Great Britain and the neighboring countries of western Europe. Agreement as to the use of air and naval bases and as to the provision of military contingents may be taken for granted.

In some cases there may be a clash between considerations of revenge and security against Germany, on one hand, and of economic wellbeing, on the other. It has already been made pretty clear that the Soviet Union will insist on considerable territorial annexations from Germany in the East, ostensibly as compensation to Poland for Polish territory which the Soviet Union annexed in 1939.

There may be French claims for a frontier on the Rhine, even for control over the Ruhr. Churchill has denied that the "no territorial aggrandizement" and similar clauses of the Atlantic Charter apply to Germany and has thereby given implied sanction to these territorial changes in the East. A French political frontier on the Rhine today would be unnatural, from the ethnographic standpoint, and the amputation from Germany of its western industrial regions would be a serious obstacle to the resumption of normal production. This would be equally true as regards the artificial partitioning of Germany into three or more separate states.

THE FALL OF FRANCE

British policy on the continent depends for effectiveness on the existence of a reasonably strong and stable France. To be sure, the France of 1944-45 can scarcely hope to play the role of the France of 1918-19, as the leading land power on the continent and, in large measure, the physical guarantor, with its Eastern allies, of European peace.

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The swift and overwhelming defeat of 1940 brought in its train a sequence of disastrous results for France. Most of the books that were published immediately after the fall of France were superficial in character, lurid and sensational, rather than factual in their interpretation of the unexpected collapse. An

altogether exaggerated emphasis was placed upon "fifth column" activities and the fundamental causes of the French defeat were ignored.

In more sober retrospect it will probably be recognized that there were two such causes. One was the declining birthrate, which made the heavy French losses in the last war irreplaceable and placed France in a more and more disadvantageous position as regards military and labor reserves. The other was the inability of France to keep pace with Germany in adaptation to an age of mass production and mechanical invention.

Defeat aggravated these French difficulties. Some two million Frenchmen, mostly of the younger and more vigorous age-groups, have been held as war prisoners or induced or compelled to work in German factories. It may be assumed that four years of malnutrition have further lowered the birthrate and undermined the health of the people. Only after the end of the war will it be possible to know how much French industrial equipment has been destroyed in the course of hostilities, how much has been dismantled and carried off to Germany.

In Paris and presumably in other large towns there has been a serious breakdown of social discipline and morality. Bands of thieves and racketeers operate with extraordinary boldness. Extortion and blackmail are rife.

DE GAULLE AND THE COMMITTEE OF LIBERATION

Even after what Zola called the debacle of the Franco-Prussian War France was in far better position to rebuild and reconstruct than it is likely to be after the end of the present war. However, a beginning has been made with the restoration of national unity through the institution, in Algiers, of the Committee of National Liberation, headed by General Charles de Gaulle. The Committee contains representatives of various political parties and of the underground resistance movement.

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A Consultative Assembly, the nucleus of a future French constituent assembly, which will be convoked after France itself is freed, has come into existence. Without attempting to prejudice the future form of the French state this assembly issues ordinances on urgent matters and listens to the reports of General de Gaulle and members of his Cabinet.

The personality of General de Gaulle has been a subject of considerable discussion. His greatest admirers would perhaps not claim that he is an easy man to get along with. But his prestige as the French General who has been the voice and the symbol of resistance since the time when France laid down its arms in June, 1940, stunned by the catastrophic defeat, stands higher than that of any other leader. It may be assumed that de Gaulle and the Committee of National Liberation will take over the functions of a de facto government as France is freed from foreign occupation, although it is a matter of conjecture how long de Gaulle's predominant political role will endure.

A certain amount of light on de Gaulle's views about the future of France and on the policies which he may be expected to follow can be found in the speech which he delivered before the Consultative Assembly on March 18, 1944. He rejected out of hand "any attempt to maintain in part or in camouflaged form the Vichy organization or any artificially created authority outside the actual government."

Making a concession to discontent with previous abuses of capitalism, de Gaulle declared that "the Government will not tolerate coalitions of interest, private monopolies or trusts, whose existence at the outset of this new period would imperil the economic and social reforms desired by the great majority of Frenchmen." He advocated a "western European grouping," in which France would play a prominent part, and which would extend to Africa and to the Arab states.

On the political side de Gaulle pledged himself to a government based on national representation, but with a "political legislative functioning vastly different from the one which finally paralyzed the Third Republic." He also called for a French social democracy "that will insure for everyone the right to freedom of work, and that will guaranty the dignity

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and security of all through an economic system planned with a view to developing our national resources, and which will not work to the advantage of private interests. In this system the great sources of national wealth will belong to the nation, and the direction and control of this wealth by the state will be undertaken with the assistance of workers and employers."

A severe testing time for the new French regime will come

in the months immediately after the cessation of fighting. War prisoners will have to be repatriated and food and work supplied to an uprooted and partially demoralized people. It may be that the government will require extraordinary temporary powers in such matters as control of prices and allocation of labor.

The coolness that has prevailed in Washington toward General de Gaulle has delayed the recognition of the Committee of Liberation as a fullfledged partner in the United Nations cause. It is argued in Washington that it would be unfair to prejudge the political future of France while the larger part of the country was under German control.

THE FUTURE OF FRANCE

It is to be hoped that a responsible representative French regime will emerge as soon as possible from the storm of war. For without such a regime the political reconstruction of Western Europe will remain uncertain and inchoate.

Only after the war will it be possible to ascertain whether the Vichy interlude has created a deep cleavage in the French national body. Optimists believe that only a small number of men have compromised themselves irretrievably and that the vast majority of the French people will close ranks for national unity.

In this connection much depends on the desire and ability of de Gaulle and his associates to maintain a high level of far-sighted statesmanship. A formidable reign of terror could be set in motion if the term "collaborationists" should be applied too broadly. There can be no serious doubt that the vast majority of the French people in 1940 were convinced of defeat and willing to accept the leadership of Marshal Petain. A wise

[42]

policy would restrict punishment to those Frenchmen who were indisputably associated with the more brutal acts of the German occupying authorities.

There will also be need for wise and tactful statesmanship in relation to France on the part of Great Britain and the United States. After the ordeal they have experienced Frenchmen will be understandably sensitive and quick to resent anything that may savor of treatment of France as a second class power.

The average Frenchman feels, and not without justification, that France fell because it was in the first line of fire, that geography and sea power probably saved England from a similar fate. The loyalty of the farflung French Empire to the French authorities is a source of national pride. So one may anticipate that Frenchmen will react indignantly to proposals that would involve a diminution of this empire, unless as part of a general scheme of renunciation of imperialism, of which there is extremely little indication.

Weakened as it has been, France remains an indispensable cornerstone of any regional organization of Western Europe. Just because this old and civilized country has been bled white to such an appalling degree during these last years one may hope that there will be no spilling of French blood in useless civil strife, that the united energies of the people can be brought to bear on what is certain to be a difficult and complex task of reconstruction.

THE SITUATION OF ITALY

Italy is in some respects in a still more difficult plight than is France. The latter can count on acceptance as one of the victorious powers. But Italy has obtained a very lukewarm reception as a "co-belligerent" and lives under the shadow of what is generally stated to be a very ruthless armistice agreement. And, like France, Italy is a battleground, with Germans and Allies alike fighting over its cities.

While some Italian émigrés are confident that their countrymen desire vast social changes, observers in Italy seem to acquire an impression of widespread apathy and cynicism. Mus-

[43]

solini's regime had endured for more than twenty years when it was overthrown by a *coup d'état* from the top in the summer of 1943. It would have been physically impossible for any large opposition movement to have maintained itself over so long a period of time. Time is required before the faculty of political criticism, numbed because of long absence of use, can reassert itself on any large scale.

Moreover, the psychological reaction of the honest Italian anti-Fascist is inevitably somewhat mixed. He feels that the Allied military administration steers a conservative course, that British policy seems anxious to maintain in key positions men

British policy seems anxious to maintain in key positions men like Badoglio who showed no scruple in serving the Fascist regime.

It cannot be said that United Nations political warfare in Italy has been calculated to unloose any very strong crusading passion among the Italians who have lived under Fascist rule. Moreover, Italians, regardless of political affiliation, face a bleak future. Nothing has been done to promise alleviation for Italy's genuine economic grievances, grievances which antedated the rise of Mussolini: overpopulation and poverty in natural resources. The Italian colonial possessions in Africa, which afforded a modest outlet for economic activity, are to be taken away. While there might be a strong case for liquidating all empires, the taking away of colonial territory from the poorer countries, not from the richer, only aggravates economic inequality.

Perhaps the best that Italy can hope for in the immediate future is to lead a modest existence as a third-rate power under the protection of Great Britain. Whether this will be the actual course of events or whether fascism will be followed by other revolutionary experiments will become clear when Italy is freed from the pressure of foreign military occupation.

POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS IN SPAIN

Spain is perhaps the least predictable of the countries of Western Europe. There are several political possibilities. The notably cordial tone in which Churchill referred to Franco in one of his speeches early in 1944 may foreshadow a British

[44]

disposition to maintain a benevolent attitude toward the Spanish dictator after the end of the war. There may be a swing of the pendulum to the Left; forces of revolt in Spain may be strong enough to unseat Franco. There might be a compromise solution in the form of the establishment of a moderate monarchical regime.

THE SMALLER DEMOCRACIES

If Spain is the least predictable, the four small democracies of Western and Northern Europe, Belgium and the Netherlands, Norway and Denmark, are probably the most stable

lands, Norway and Denmark, are probably the most stable, the least likely to resort to extreme revolutionary courses after the end of the war.

All these countries enjoyed a relatively high standard of living under freely chosen governments before the war. The rival extremist ideas of communism and fascism had made less progress there than in almost any part of Europe. Danish rural cooperatives were a model for the world; and all these small democracies, without indulging in the ballyhoo that is so characteristic of the streamlined modern dictatorship, could show many positive examples of social progress. The number of active collaborators with the invaders has been small. So these countries will probably be less changed than most other parts of Europe after the war, apart from the inevitable element of impoverishment. The Netherlands is exposed to the special danger of being flooded if it should become a battleground. The Dutch Government-in-exile has intimated semi-officially that it will demand territorial compensation from Germany in such an eventuality.

THE FUTURE OF WESTERN EUROPE

Making all due allowance for the unpredictable reactions of the European peoples after the five years of war, invasion and blockade, it would seem that violent change is not probable in Western Europe, except perhaps in Spain. Many observers believe that men and women on the spot, who have borne the brunt of the resistance movement and shared the hardships of the time, will command more popular support and confidence

[45]

than those who, for however praiseworthy reasons, went abroad to the comparative security of Great Britain and the United States.

The countries of Western Europe are not likely to "go Communist," in the sense of setting up Soviet republics on the Russian model. On the other hand property rights have been thoroughly scrambled by the German occupation and the mood of setting public advantage above private profit has been strengthened by the sufferings of the occupation period. So it will not be surprising if some social and economic changes which seem radical by American standards will be put into effect with a pretty wide measure of popular approval.

Great Britain will exercise more influence than any other

power in this area and fairly sweeping common defense agreements may almost be taken for granted. After the grim experience of 1940 no West European country is likely to revert to the illusion of isolated security. A greater measure of economic integration may grow out of the urgent needs of reconstruction.

V. EUROPE EAST

Before the outbreak of the Second World War there were about 120,000,000 people, divided into thirteen states, in Europe East, the area stretching from Finland on the Arctic to Greece on the Mediterranean, bounded on one side by the Soviet Union, on the other by Germany and Italy. A federation of these states would have created a new major land power in Europe.


But no such federation came into being. The nations in Eastern Europe vary widely in size and population, from pre-war Poland, with 35,000,000 inhabitants, to Estonia, with a little over one million, from progressive and cultured Czechoslovakia to primitive and tribal Albania. The political weakness of this middle zone between Germany and Russia has always led to the numerous and sometimes antagonistic divisions of its peoples.

Before the First World War the Balkan countries maintained a precarious independence, although they were often utilized as

[46]

THE PEOPLES OF CENTRAL EUROPE





1. SCANDINAVIANS (DANES & SWEDES) 2. DUTCH 3. FRENCH 4. GERMANS
 5. ITALIANS 6. LETTS 7. LITHUANIANS 8. EAST SLAVS 9. POLES 10. CZECHS
 11. MAGYARS 12. RUMANIANS 13. SLOVENES 14. SERBS AND CROATS
 15. BULGARIANS 16. MACEDONIANS 17. ALBANIANS 18. GREEKS 19. TURKS

*From "Mainsprings of World Politics"—Brooks Emeny.
 Headline Series, Foreign Policy Association.*

pawns in the policies of stronger powers, such as Russia and Austria-Hungary. But the other regions that became independent nations after 1918 were all swallowed up in the three big empires of Europe before 1914, Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary.

EASTERN EUROPE BETWEEN THE TWO WORLD WARS

The situation at the end of the First World War created singularly favorable conditions for the reorganization of Eastern Europe along the lines of nationality. Germany was defeated, Austria-Hungary was in a state of dissolution, Russia was weakened by revolution and civil war. Had the nations of Eastern Europe, after achieving free national existence, sought additional strength through inclusive military and economic federation, an effective barrier might have been erected against a revival of German and Russian expansionism and the entire

history of the last decade might have been appreciably different.

But inherited nationalist antagonisms and suspicions and new economic rivalries thwarted the realization of any inclusive federation project. The natural leader in such a scheme would have been Poland, because of its size and central position. Josef Pilsudski, the strongest personality in the formative period of the new Polish state, believed in the ideal of East European federalism. The Polish campaign against Russia in 1920 and the temporary occupation of Kiev, in the Ukraine, were prompted by this ideal of a federation of states from the Baltic to the Black Sea.

But Poland in its internal administration did not treat national minorities with sufficient liberality to inspire much confidence in its leadership in a wider federation. The Ukrainians, the largest of these minorities, constantly complained of oppressive and discriminatory treatment. Poland was on bad terms with its nearest neighbors, Lithuania and Czechoslovakia. The town of Wilno, to which Poland laid claim on cultural grounds, while Lithuania asserted its right to the town because at one time it was the capital of Lithuania, was arbitrarily seized by Polish armed forces. After the Munich settlement Poland put pressure on Czechoslovakia to surrender the Teschen area, one

[48]

of those troublesome mixed population regions which are so numerous in Eastern Europe.

Limited attempts at federation, such as the Little Entente and the Balkan Union, failed to withstand the test of German aggressive diplomacy, backed by the threat and finally by the use of armed force. The Little Entente consisted of three states, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Rumania, of which the first owed its existence to the First World War and the two latter greatly extended their territories as a result of the break-up of Austria-Hungary. The Little Entente was largely directed against Hungary. Its location was awkward for defense and it proved incapable of common action when Germany set about the methodical dismemberment of Czechoslovakia.

The loose understanding among the Balkan powers, while it helped to maintain peace in that troubled peninsula, also failed to function as an effective barrier to German expansion. Rumania and Bulgaria joined Germany under more or less pres-

sure. Yugoslavia and Greece resisted and were crushed by invasion and subsequently torn by internal feuds.

SOVIET POLICY IN EASTERN EUROPE—INFLUENCE OR ANNEXATION

The Polish and Czechoslovak governments-in-exile in the first years of the war advanced fairly far toward the conclusion of a federal pact that might have served as the nucleus of an East European federation. But these negotiations were broken off by the Czechs, apparently under pressure from Russia. Indeed, from the time in the winter of 1942-43 when the tide of German invasion began to roll back from its extreme limits in Russia, the Volga and the foothills of the Caucasus, it has become increasingly clear that Stalin's demands and desires will most probably be a decisive factor in the shaping of Eastern Europe.

The Soviet Union proposes to annex a considerable part of Eastern Europe, inhabited by more than twenty million people. In this area are the formerly independent Baltic Republics, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, the Isthmus of Karelia and other regions of Finland, about forty per cent of the territory of pre-war Poland, up to the so-called Curzon Line, and the regions

[49]

of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, which formerly belonged to Rumania.

The Soviet Government has put forward no further territorial claims. But it has given more than one indication that it considers the whole of Eastern Europe as a sphere of influence, in which foreign intervention is undesired and unwelcome. British and American proposals to mediate in the Soviet-Polish dispute were rebuffed. The Soviet alliance with Czechoslovakia was in the nature of those exclusive alliances which Secretary Hull, according to his speech before Congress after returning from the Moscow conference of Foreign Ministers, hoped to see eliminated in the future.

Soviet diplomacy became markedly more aggressive and self-confident in the first months of 1944, when successful defense had given way to victorious advance against a weakening German resistance. An interesting decision at this time, while ostensibly only concerned with the internal structure of the Soviet Union, may have important repercussions in the field of foreign relations.

This was the announcement that the Soviet constituent republics, of which there are officially sixteen, including the newly organized Latvian, Lithuanian, Estonian, Karelo-Finnish and Moldavian, should control their own foreign relations and military affairs. Hitherto these functions had been reserved for the Soviet central government.

Because of the highly centralized control of Soviet political life by the ruling Communist Party this change was less significant, as regards internal organization, than it would have been in a more democratic and loosely organized federation. It may be safely assumed that anyone who would be appointed commissar for foreign affairs or military affairs in one of the constituent republics would be a Communist. Should he take any action displeasing to Moscow he could be and most probably would be removed from office and transferred to some other post by decision of the higher Party authorities.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE SOVIET UNION

But the change may be important insofar as it makes possible

[50]

a protective federative attitude of the Soviet Union toward border states which it is not proposed to Sovietize, at least for the time being. What President Benes and other Czech leaders hope is that, while Czech foreign policy will be closely coordinated with that of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia will retain freedom as to its internal political and economic institutions. This is perhaps the maximum that any country in Eastern Europe can anticipate after the end of the present war. For by a process of elimination Germany and the Soviet Union remained the only strong military powers on the continent. The prospective reduction of Germany to impotence under the "unconditional surrender" formula leaves the Soviet Union with what amounts to a monopoly of military power east of the Rhine. And Stalin has given several proofs of his determination to exploit all the advantages of this position.

Acceptance of Soviet hegemony is politically and psychologically easier for some peoples than for others. Here geographical location and historical experiences, remote and recent, must be taken into account. Apart from their romantic and accidental involvement in an early phase of the Russian civil war, the Czechs have never clashed with Russia. Responding to a Rus-

CZECHS HAVE NEVER CLASHED WITH RUSSIA. Responding to a Pan-Slav impulse, tens of thousands of Czechs and Slovaks deserted from the Austro-Hungarian army and passed over to the Russian side in the First World War.

The Czechs feel that France and Great Britain let them down at the time of the Munich settlement. They believe, whether with or without justification, that the Soviet Union would have supported them at this time, if the Western powers had stood firm. With France an uncertain factor and England far away, the Czechs, far too small a people to confront Germany alone, naturally hope that the Soviet Union will be a powerful guarantor of their independence in the future. Acceptance of this status of a Soviet protected state has been made easier because the Soviet Government has put forward no demands for Czech territory and because Stalin has repeatedly repudiated any desire to change the social order of countries outside the Soviet frontier.

[51]

POLAND AND THE SOVIET UNION

The Polish experience has been quite different; and the adjustment on an equitable basis of Soviet-Polish relations has been a difficult moral and political problem for the Western powers. The Soviet Union played toward Poland the role of a secondary aggressor, invading Poland from the East after Hitler had attacked Poland from the West. A partition of Poland was agreed on between Stalin and Hitler, with the Soviet Union retaining over forty per cent of the area of Poland.

Soviet justification for this action was that the majority of the people in the occupied regions were White Russians and Ukrainians. Polish census figures, however, indicate that of over eleven million inhabitants of the regions annexed to the Soviet Union five and a quarter million, the largest single ethnic group, consisted of Poles. The Soviet action was scarcely consistent with the non-aggression treaty, based on respect for existing frontiers, which had been signed between the Soviet and Polish Governments in 1934; and it was not ratified by a free plebiscite. While there were votes on the issue of joining the Soviet Union, these votes were taken under Soviet military occupation and without the slightest possibility for the ex-

pression of contrary opinion. The same comment would hold good for the so-called elections which took place in the Baltic States, and preceded the absorption of these countries into the Soviet Union.

Soviet rule in the occupied Polish regions was harsh and a large number of people, a million and a half according to an official statement of the Polish Government-in-exile, were deported to the Soviet Union. Many were sent to forced labor concentration camps, where death and disease were rampant.

A better era in Soviet-Polish relations seemed to be in prospect after Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government concluded a treaty of alliance with the Polish Government-in-exile, then headed by General Sikorski, the agreement between the Soviet Union and Germany relating to the partition of Poland was officially renounced. Poles were released from imprisonment in Russia, and a Polish army was organized on Soviet soil to fight the Germans.

[52]

But the Soviet attitude toward Poland hardened perceptibly as the war with Germany took a more favorable turn. Difficulties were placed in the way of the equipment and provisioning of the Polish army, and most of its units, under the command of General Anders, were evacuated to Iran and have subsequently been fighting with the United Nations forces in Italy. In the spring of 1943 the Soviet Government broke off relations with the Polish Government-in-exile, using as a pretext the request of the Polish Government for an International Red Cross investigation of a German allegation that the corpses of thousands of Polish officers, massacred by the Soviet authorities, had been discovered in the Katyn Forest, near Smolensk. Almost a year afterwards the Soviet Government held an "investigation" of its own, which, as might have been expected, led to the conclusion that the Germans had killed the officers.

A so-called Union of Polish Patriots, a small group of Polish Communists and near-Communists in Moscow, began to issue propaganda literature and manifestoes with the obvious approval of the Soviet Government. Early in 1944 the Soviet Government announced its readiness to discuss boundary regulations with Poland on the basis of the Curzon Line, which was slightly more favorable to Poland than the frontier which had been fixed at the time of the Soviet-German partition. This

offer was accompanied, however, by abuse of the Polish Government in London, which was denounced as incapable of serving the interests of the Polish people. Offers of American and British mediation were declined.

After the Soviet armies crossed the line into what was admittedly Polish territory, in the summer of 1944, a Polish National Council, obviously pro-Soviet in orientation, but organized on a somewhat broader basis than the Union of Polish Patriots, emerged as an organ of civilian administration on Polish territory freed from the Germans. The Council issued an appeal, completely in harmony with the aims of Soviet foreign policy, calling on the Polish people to renounce their eastern provinces and to concentrate on compensation at the expense of Germany in the West.

Shortly afterwards Prime Minister Mikolajczyk, probably at

[53]

the suggestion of Roosevelt and Churchill, went to Moscow. He was received with outward signs of courtesy, despite the former abuse of his government. But his talks with Stalin and with the spokesmen of the pro-Soviet Polish groups led to no positive result. He departed from Moscow with the ambiguous suggestion that perhaps some of the difficult questions could be solved better after Warsaw had been liberated from the Germans.

The balance of physical force in this Soviet-Polish dispute is heavily on the side of the Soviet Union. On the other hand Polish nationalism is a strong force and it would be an embarrassment to Stalin to be obliged to face an underground Polish resistance movement after the end of the war. The moral effect in Great Britain and the United States could not be altogether discounted, even though since Teheran the idea of a Soviet regional hegemony in Eastern Europe seems to have been widely accepted.

A just solution of Poland's eastern and western boundary questions would be the return, so far as possible, of all uprooted populations, and subsequent secret and honestly conducted plebiscites to determine the allegiance of areas where the racial make-up of the people is mixed. But tanks, airplanes and cannon weigh heavily in the scales of peace settlement. There can certainly be little doubt, at the present moment, of Stalin's ability to draw the western frontier of the Soviet Union

where he chooses. It remains to be seen whether he can obtain in Poland a genuinely friendly government that is representative of the sentiments of the Polish people. Such a government obviously will not come into existence unless there is reasonable consideration for Polish national interests and feelings.

THE BALTIC STATES

Ideal justice would also call for plebiscites in the Baltic Republics, with perhaps an assurance to the Soviet Union of the right to maintain extraterritorial air, naval and military bases in the Baltic area, if the voting was in favor of independence, as it probably would be. A people might be willing to forego independence in order to obtain a higher standard of

[54]

living through absorption in a more advanced country. But before the outbreak of the war the standard of living in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, modest as it was, clearly exceeded the Soviet standard of living. There is general testimony that Red Army soldiers, coming into the Baltic towns, were amazed at the quantity and variety of goods which could be bought freely and without ration cards.

However, the Baltic States are small and defenseless. At the time of writing (August 20) they are a battleground, as they were in the first weeks of the German-Soviet war. With the German military collapse they will almost certainly pass under Soviet occupation.

Finland presents a tragic spectacle of a small country, advanced in culture, democratic in spirit and political and social institutions, which was forced into the war on the wrong side. Public opinion throughout the world, except in Communist circles, was almost unanimous in applauding Finland's resistance to the unprovoked Soviet attack at the end of November, 1939. Winston Churchill took this occasion to express his opinion of freedom's debt to Finland in the following very strong terms:

"Only Finland—superb, nay sublime, in the jaws of peril—Finland shows what free men can do. The service rendered by Finland to mankind is magnificent. . . . We cannot tell what the fate of Finland may be, but no more mournful spectacle could be presented to what is left of civilized mankind than that this splendid Northern race should be at last worn down and

reduced to servitude worse than death by the dull brutish force of overwhelming numbers. If the light of freedom which still burns so brightly in the frozen North should be finally quenched, it might well herald a return to the Dark Ages, when every vestige of human progress during two thousand years would be engulfed."

The annexationist peace which was imposed on Finland after this first unequal struggle and subsequent Soviet threats to the independence of the reduced Finnish state led Finland to admit German troops into the country during the interval between the two wars. When the German-Soviet war broke out Finland hesitated for several days, but Soviet bombings of Finnish cities

[55]

predetermined its entrance into the war on the German side.

The Finnish Government, which retained freedom of action because its capital and most of its territory were not occupied by German troops, made overtures for a separate peace in the spring of 1944. The Soviet terms, which involved a further territorial concession in the surrender of Petsamo and the payment of an indemnity of 600,000,000 dollars (more than the annual Finnish national income) were rejected as too harsh. A fierce Soviet offensive wrested from Finland the Karelian Isthmus and the old Finnish town of Viipuri in June, 1944. Finland continued the struggle; but an emergency change in the presidency, replacing the former President, Risto Ryti, by Field Marshal Mannerheim, was interpreted in some quarters as a preliminary move toward peace.

It was a disaster for Finland that it was not able to join a neutral bloc of likeminded Scandinavian countries. One reason why Finland fought so desperately against such heavy odds is that, as a non-Slav country, with no element of affinity with Russia and bitter memories both of efforts at Russification under the Tsars and of the sanguinary civil war of 1918, it resented any suggestion of subjugation or loss of territory to Russia.

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE BALKAN STATES

Toward the South the Soviet armies have already occupied Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina and have penetrated a short distance into Old Rumania. Bessarabia was a former Russian

distance into Old Rumania. Bessarabia was a former Russian province with a mixed population. It was seized by Rumania during the Russian civil war. Northern Bukovina formerly belonged to Austria-Hungary and was absorbed by Rumania after the First World War. It has a predominantly Ukrainian population.

When the Soviet armies crossed the Pruth River into Old Rumania Foreign Commissar Molotov gave a public assurance that this was a military move, and that there would be no effort to annex territory or to change the Rumanian social system. According to the accounts of foreign correspondents who visited

[56]

the occupied area in the summer of 1944, this promise had been kept.

One of the countries where most blood has flowed during the war is Yugoslavia. The German invasion and the German-Italian occupation let loose some fierce internal feuds, largely along racial lines. Internal strife was superimposed on a grim guerrilla struggle against the Germans in the mountainous regions of Yugoslavia.

The experience of Yugoslavia shows that Eastern Europe has been weak not only because of antagonisms between states, but because of hostility between ethnic groups within the same state. There had never been a full understanding between the Serbs and the Croats, the two largest racial groups in Yugoslavia. The Serbs are Orthodox in faith and formerly lived in the independent state of Serbia. The Croats are Roman Catholics and were under Austro-Hungarian rule until the break-up of the Austrian Empire.

The Croats, according to the Serb version, showed a lukewarm attitude toward the war. Some of them followed the leadership of the adventurer Ante Pavelitch, who became head of the nominally independent Croatia that was set up by the Axis powers as part of the dismemberment of Yugoslavia. Massacres of Serbs by the Ustashi, the terrorist guards organized by Pavelitch, added fuel to the flame of racial bitterness.

This Serb-Croat feud helps to explain the hostility between the Communist leader Josip Broz, who is now generally called Marshal Tito and the original leader of Serb guerrilla resistance, General Draja Mikhailovitch. The former is a Croat and most of the members of his so-called Partisan administration are non-Serbs. His movement is pro-Russia and pro-Communist, although it draws support from many non-Communist peasant insurgents.

The stronghold of Mikhailovitch is in Old Serbia. From the

beginning Tito received the active support of the Soviet Government. Great Britain, after supporting Mikhailovitch, switched its military and diplomatic aid to Tito. Whether this was a gesture of concession to Stalin or a recognition of Tito's superior ability as a guerrilla leader is a question which can

[57]

only be answered with some element of certainty after the end of the war. News from Yugoslavia is, for the most part, highly partisan and very contradictory and considerations of censorship and great power politics have tended to complicate and obscure the actual situation. Tito is obviously in a strong position so long as he possesses the support both of the Soviet Union and of Great Britain. On the other hand there is no convincing proof that the Serbs, who constitute a little over half the population of Yugoslavia, have lost confidence in Mikhailovitch, or that they would willingly accept a predominantly Croat Government.

Bulgaria was drawn into the war partly by German pressure, partly by the hope of redressing territorial grievances against Yugoslavia and Greece. A statement by the Bulgarian Prime Minister in August indicated a desire to quit what was regarded as the Nazi sinking ship. Apart from political systems and ideologies, there is a traditionally strong Russophile sentiment in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, which received Russian support in their struggle for independence from Turkey.

THE FUTURE OF EASTERN EUROPE

So far as can be foreseen, a part of what was Europe East before the war will be absorbed into the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union will assume a position of hegemony in the rest of this area. Conservative changes inside the Soviet Union and the current emphasis on nationalist development, rather than on international revolution, create a possible basis for co-existence of the Soviet Union and more individualistic social and economic orders in some of its protected states. Advocacy of social revolution has not figured prominently in Soviet war

of social revolution has not figured prominently in Soviet war propaganda.

Insofar as the Soviet Union respects the national independence of its neighbor states and stands as a guarantor against any resumption of German aggressive imperialism the prestige which it has acquired by its successful stand in the war will be carried over into the peace. But the one-sided settlements which Stalin has imposed in the case of Poland, Finland and the Baltic

[58]

States cannot be reconciled with the principles of the Atlantic Charter or with an ideal world order.

Security is sometimes represented as a major objective of Soviet foreign policy. It may sound paradoxical, but it is probably true that after the crushing defeat of Nazi Germany only the Soviet Government can endanger Soviet security—if it creates among the smaller states an atmosphere of apprehension and insecurity.

VI. EUROPE'S ALTERNATIVES

The Second World War has now advanced to a stage where some of its lessons can be drawn and some of its consequences may be reasonably anticipated. One of these consequences is certainly a severe relative decline in the political power and economic well-being and social stability of Europe outside the Soviet Union.

CHAOS IN EUROPE

The concluding scenes of the tragic war drama have not been played. We cannot know how much horror and bloodshed lie ahead. But humanity in Europe has been uprooted to a degree that cannot be paralleled by anything that occurred in the last war. The energies of most of the continental European countries will be absorbed for many years in urgent human and material relief and salvage problems.

It would be a bold prophet who would predict when the bomb-shattered cities will be rebuilt, the ruined ports made ready for use, the bands of youthful criminals reintegrated into society, the millions of homeless and deported individuals brought back to normal conditions of living. And this reconstruction will take place under the supervision and control of non-European powers, which will possess almost a monopoly

of military power at the end of the war. Perhaps this power will be exercised with benevolent intentions. But it will be difficult to convince Europeans that their interests will not receive secondary consideration if these seem to clash with those of the victorious powers.

[59]

in European countries are strong enough to bring about revolutions, with the setting up of dictatorships on the Russian model, except in cases when the Red Army would intervene in their favor. And Stalin's policy has been moving away from the conception of world salvation through international revolution to a much more conventional pattern of safeguarding Soviet national interests through alliances, protectorates and spheres of influence.

Two contradictory moods are reported among the people of the warring countries, and it remains to be seen what compromise or equilibrium will be struck between these two moods. A prolonged war, with its accompaniments of mass mobilization and severe rationing, is favorable to experiments in socialization. Currency systems have been wrecked, savings have been destroyed and the physical wealth, in the shape of industrial plant, which is represented by industrial stocks and bonds has often been destroyed by the widespread bombing of factories.

Moreover, men in uniform often acquire the habit of expecting the government to plan for them and look after them. All these considerations seem to favor an expansion of public and social at the expense of private enterprise.

At the same time there are reports of widespread violation and evasion of the stringent Nazi economic regulations. A gigantic black market radiates all over Europe. People are sick of regimentation. No doubt each country will find its own way of reconciling the demand for social security with the demand for freedom from stifling regimentation, insofar as this can be done.

DANGER OF ANARCHY IN GERMANY AND OCCUPIED COUNTRIES

Against this background of what seems to be fairly definite consequences of the war one may examine the alternative forms

of European organization. The danger of a lapse of considerable areas into sheer anarchical chaos is probably greater than it was after the last war.

As the time of the Nazi collapse draws nearer communi-

[62]

tions will tend to break down; food supply will become more strained and irregular. The millions of foreign workers in Germany will be eager to return to their homes before food and transportation can be provided for them, even with the most efficient organization.

There will be grim clashes of extermination, with no quarter given on either side, between German soldiers and colonists, on one side, and the rising guerrilla movements in occupied countries, on the other. It is quite possible that the alleged bomb attempt on Hitler's life and the subsequent purge may prove only a curtain-raiser to fierce internal feuds between the Nazi leadership and the Army, and between various factions in the Nazi Party.

Moreover, the mood of a defeated Germany will be far more desperate and hopeless than it was in 1918 and 1919. Then there were the assurances of the Fourteen Points; now there is only the stern demand for unconditional surrender, coupled with the statement that war criminals will be punished "at the scene of their crimes."

The number of people who could conceivably be included in this category of war criminals is large. The Nazi indoctrination has apparently affected the German youth more seriously than Fascist propaganda influenced the Italians. So it is hard to foresee what final acts of despair Nazis in positions of power who feel that they can expect no quarter may commit.

While the majority of the Germans may be almost literally numb from the strain of total war against increasingly hopeless odds, from the physical and psychological effects of air bombings, there will certainly be an element in the Nazi Party that will go underground and endeavor to prolong the struggle through acts of terrorism and sabotage.

It has been reported that the Gestapo has made a methodical study of the methods employed by resistance groups in occu-

pied countries, with a view to utilizing the more effective tactics at the time when Nazism itself will be an underground movement. The mountains of Austria and Bavaria may become hide-outs for last-ditch guerrilla fighters.

Open military resistance will be gradually mopped up. It will

[63]

probably be harder to deal with camouflaged former Nazis who will try to work within the administration of Germany for purposes of disorganization and to suppress secret organizations and irregular "courts" that will carry out terrorist acts against Germans who collaborate with the occupation authorities.

Neither the psychology of the Nazis nor the character of the peace, so far as it is known in advance, will contribute to early and easy pacification. Insofar as there is any contact between Germans and inhabitants of the occupied countries, there will be a settling of scores for some time after the war. It will also require a mixture of tactful diplomacy and military force to quell the racial and factional feuds in the Balkans and to create minimum conditions for a return to peacetime activity.

Sporadic fighting in remote regions that are difficult to police may continue for some time after the war is officially ended. But the instinctive will to live is strong and it is unlikely that the greater part of Europe will lapse into the state of permanent disorder that one finds in some primitive regions where there is no strong or settled government.

Food distribution will be a force for stability. And the obvious need to restore wrecked utilities and communications and water supply systems may be an argument for a speedy return to orderly administration. What political alternatives will exist for the postwar Europe?

ALTERNATIVE I—ALLIANCES AND SECURITY BLOCKS

However strong may be the emotional desire to take up life where it was before the Nazi career of conquest started, a reversion to the system of twenty odd independent sovereign states that existed before 1938 is scarcely feasible. At least three of these states will have been absorbed into the Soviet Union.

And in the light of the experience of the last few years no small nation can feel confident of its ability to ward off invasion, either through strict observance of neutrality or by force

of arms. Alliances and security blocks are almost certain to be formed for the purpose of multiplying the obviously inadequate strength of the average small or medium sized state under conditions of modern warfare.

[64]

ALTERNATIVE 2—BRITISH AND SOVIET SPHERES OF INFLUENCE

Another European alternative, and one that seems likely to come into effect, at least temporarily, is the division of Europe into British and Soviet spheres of influence. It has already been shown how Great Britain gives every indication of being the paramount power in the West, while the Soviet Union is playing a similar role in the East. Conforming, perhaps, to national tradition, British influence is exercised more subtly, Soviet more directly and sometimes brutally, as in the forcible annexation of the Baltic Republics and parts of Poland and Finland.

This arrangement grows directly out of the power relations which have been established by the war. Some observers will hail it as a "practical" means of keeping Germany down and assuring peace in Europe. Yet both the desirability and the durability of such an informal partition of Europe are open to grave question.

A warweary, stupefied, apathetic continent may accept Anglo-Soviet hegemony more or less passively and fatalistically for a time. But such a form of organization, with its implicit categories of first class and second class nations, would certainly excite bitterness and resentment in the long run. At a time when former colonial areas in Asia and, to a lesser extent, in Africa are beginning to stir with demands for national recognition, it scarcely seems feasible to reduce European countries with old and proud traditions to a masked colonial status.

Moreover, there could be no guaranty of the permanence of the partition. Great Britain would suspect Soviet intrigue in disturbances that might occur in Greece or Italy. The Soviet Government would suspect the hand of England behind troubles which might occur in its own sphere of influence. The uneasy equilibrium of such a partition would be completely upset if either power should draw Germany, even a prostrate and defeated Germany, with its heritage of industrial plant and technical and organizing skill, completely into its own orbit. It seems that the peace will be of a ruthless punitive character. But restrictions on German rearmament would quickly vanish if the two rival sovereigns of Europe should begin to bid for

German support.

[65]

ALTERNATIVE 3—FEDERAL ORGANIZATION FOR EUROPE

So, by a process of elimination, it would seem that some form of federal organization for Europe outside the Soviet Union would afford the most hopeful solution of achieving what is, or ought to be a primary American war aim: a peaceful and prosperous Europe. It is a fault of some American well-meaning planners to brush off difficulties too lightly, to speak of world government as if such an ambitious conception could be realized immediately, with a little all-around goodwill.

It would be a grave mistake to overlook the difficulties of building up a United States of Europe. It is not only the multiplicity of tongues that represents an obstacle. Historically and culturally there is a wide gulf between Europe West and Europe East. There is little in common, for instance, between a Dutch banker or a French government employee and a Rumanian or Yugoslav peasant.

Unlike the American colonies, which are sometimes mentioned as a model for the future European federation, the countries of Europe possess long memories of war and the present conflict will create a legacy of hatred of most European peoples against the Germans, and of some peoples who more or less sided with the Axis against those who resisted.

A working federation of Europe almost certainly cannot be created overnight. It will have to emerge gradually from more limited schemes of co-operation for functional and economic purposes. Regional federations will most probably precede the more ambitious project of creating a union of all European states.

Yet, when all the difficulties are fairly recognized and faced, the idea of European federation is more attractive than any alternative scheme of European organization. It is only under some form of federalism that some of the principles which must underlie a just and permanent peace settlement, self-determination, cultural autonomy, equal treatment for all peoples, guaranties against aggression and domination, stand much chance of being realized.

If Europe remains divided into more than a score of states,

[66]

each with its army, its civil service, its customs frontier—economic distress and poverty, so often breeders of dictators and fanatical doctrines, cannot be overcome. The artificial dismemberment and fragmentation of Germany would only increase the evil. In a divided Europe disputes over strategically or economically desirable towns and bits of territory assume disproportionate importance. Every government, through fear of "fifth columns," will be tempted to be harsh and repressive in its attitude toward national minorities.

HOPE IN A UNITED EUROPE

How different and how much more hopeful the picture would become under an inclusive federal organization, with a common army or police force, with a common currency and free trade throughout the European area! Fair frontiers would be easier to draw, because frontiers would become comparatively unimportant. Cultural autonomy, in the sense of free use of the local language in schools, courts and public business, would be much easier to implement, even for small racial enclaves.

A federal organization of Europe would vastly facilitate the solution of the "German problem." Schemes for the dismemberment of Germany, for the creation of artificial separate states, for the creation of some form of foreign ownership of German heavy industries, for the dismantling of German factories, are counsels of despair. Their realization would intensify economic chaos and sow seeds of new wars.

On the other hand the inclusion of Germany within a federated Europe in which Germans would be a permanent minority, less than twenty-five per cent of the population of the federation, would be the surest and most painless method of curbing any recrudescence of German aggression. The dreary prospect of turning millions of Germans into second class citizens of Poland, France, Czechoslovakia and other foreign lands would be averted. Political and military control within the federation could be so arranged that neither Germany nor any other single power could manipulate the political and military machinery to its own advantage.

A natural productive unit like the Ruhr could be easily linked up with complementary industrial areas in Belgium, France and Luxemburg and could be treated and managed as an asset for the whole of Europe, not as an exclusive German possession or as an unnatural expropriated area in which unwilling Germans would work for foreign masters. The establishment of a common European authority would make possible advantageous measures of unification in regard to transportation and communication and public utilities and would greatly advance the prospect of a resumption of mutually advantageous trade between a reconstructed Europe and the other large regional units of the world, the Americas, the British Empire, the Soviet Union.

There can be little doubt as to the choice of American public opinion if confronted with the alternatives of a brutally vindictive peace which would perpetuate hatred and insecurity and a constructive attempt to implement honestly the principles of the Atlantic Charter through the organization of a European federation. Winston Churchill has gone further than any prominent statesman in endorsing the idea of such a federation when he declared, in his speech of March 21, 1943:

“One can imagine that under a world institution embodying or representing the United Nations, and some day all nations, there should come into being a Council of Europe. . . .

“We must try to make the Council of Europe, or whatever it may be called, into a really effective league with all the strongest forces concerned woven into its texture, with a high court to adjust disputes, and with forces, armed forces, national or international or both, held ready to enforce these decisions and prevent renewed aggression and the preparation of future wars.

“It is my earnest hope that we shall achieve the largest common measure of the integrated life of Europe that is possible without destroying the individual characteristics and traditions of its many ancient and heroic races. All this will, I believe, be found to harmonize with the high permanent interests of Britain, the United States and Russia. It certainly cannot be accomplished without their cordial and concerted agreement and direct participation. Thus and thus only will the glory of Europe rise again.”

The Soviet Union in the past has been opposed to the Pan-European idea, apprehending that it might serve as a mask for

a hostile anti-Soviet combination. If, however, Soviet objectives are peace and ability to work out its social and economic system unhampered, the Soviet Government may accept the view that an independent united Europe would be a more favorable development than a squabbling divided Europe, over which the Soviet Union and Great Britain would be very likely to clash.

Great crises call for great remedies. The more one considers the principles on which the great religious bodies and other groups have agreed as the bases of enduring peace and genuine world order, the more these principles seem incompatible with the old Europe of isolated nation-states or with a condition of permanent inequality as between various peoples. If these principles are to stand a fair chance of application, there must be a federal Europe to take its place among the larger regional groupings of a world in which these groupings in turn will put forward some common council for the maintenance of peace. In one of Europe's darkest hours the dawn of a new better future for Europe and the world would appear if there could be at least a beginning in the realization of the prediction which George Washington once made to Lafayette:

"We have sowed seeds of Liberty and Union that will spring up everywhere upon earth. Some day, taking its pattern from the United States, there will be founded a United States of Europe."

OUTLINE FOR STUDY COURSE

This pamphlet is designed for use for a three session study course, to precede or follow three more sessions to be devoted to a study of the situation in Eastern Asia. It is suggested that each member of the class have a copy of this pamphlet, and that they read the applicable section before each session. If possible, arrangements should be made to have at least one copy of the reference books and pamphlets recommended available, either through purchase or arrangement with the local library. Each topic might be assigned to two or three members of the study group, and these members should be responsible for reading the reference material which is particularly pertinent to the topic assigned, so that they can discuss it. The specific references are listed after each session.

SESSION I

CHAPTERS 1 AND 2. EFFECTS OF THE WAR AND IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVES FOR PEACE.

*TOPIC 1. RELIEF AND RECONSTRUCTION.

How do you think the destruction in Europe will compare with that after the last war?

What do you think the food problem will be and how should it be handled?

Will the displacement of populations which has occurred during the war complicate reconstruction?

†‡TOPIC 2. FREER ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION.

Will the disruption of the industrial economy complicate recovery?

Do you think that the breakdown of trade barriers brought about by German occupation should be continued after the war?

Is a freer economy an important factor for future peace?

°TOPIC 3. CIVIL LIBERTIES.

Do you think freedom of religion is important for peace?

Are freedom of speech and the press important, and how can they be brought about?

How do you think freedom of movement would contribute to better relations between peoples?

‡TOPIC 4. POLITICAL FACTORS.

What do you think about self-determination?

To what extent do you think the pre-war regimes will be returned to power?

Can the establishment of representative governments be encouraged?

- * *Public Affairs Pamphlet—Have We Food Enough For All?*
- † *A Peace That Pays—Brockway*
- ‡ *Time For Decision—Welles*
- ° *Religious Liberty*

SESSION II

CHAPTER 3. PIVOTAL GERMANY.

- *§TOPIC 1. GERMANY'S IDEOLOGY.
Do you think the German people as a whole accepted the Hitler ideology?
Can they be re-educated to a different point of view, and if so, how?
- †‡TOPIC 2. THE BREAKING UP OF GERMANY.
Will the taking of East Prussia, and possibly the Ruhr and Rhineland from Germany make for future peace?
Would you be in favor of breaking Germany up into several states?
- *§TOPIC 3. GERMANY AND THE FUTURE WORLD ORDER.
Do you think the German people are capable of developing Democratic Government?
How can we help the better elements in Germany to assume responsibility?
Should we help Germany to economic well-being and political stability after the war?

CHAPTER 4. EUROPE WEST.

- °TOPIC 1. BRITISH INFLUENCE IN THE WEST.
What are Britain's objectives from the point of view of security?
What are her economic objectives?
- ¶TOPIC 2. THE POSITION OF FRANCE.
Do you agree with the author that the declining birth-rate was the cause of the defeat of France? Were there moral and spiritual factors?
Do you think that the political corruption in France was a contributing factor?
Do you think that France has had a moral and spiritual awakening?

- °TOPIC 3. THE FUTURE OF WESTERN EUROPE.
 How do you think the bitterness brought on by war will complicate the future peace?
 How can better relations between the peoples of Europe be brought about?
 What contribution can Christian attitudes make?

* *Germany After Hitler—Hagen*

† *Time For Decision—Welles*

‡ *U.S. War Aims—Lippmann*

° *On the Threshold of World Order—Dean*

§ *Appendix—Statement on the Peace Settlement in Europe*

¶ *France, Pivot of the Continent—Miller*

SESSION III

CHAPTER 5. EUROPE EAST.

- *TOPIC 1. SOVIET POLICY AND THE BALTIC STATES.
 What do you think of Soviet policy in relation to Poland? Is it in accord with the Atlantic Charter and will it lead to peace in Europe?
 Do you believe that annexation of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, by the Soviets, is justified, and that the people of those countries will accept it?
 What solutions do you think are possible and desirable in relation to Finland?
- †TOPIC 2. SOVIET POLICY AND THE BALKANS.
 Is the treaty of the Soviets with Czechoslovakia likely to work out to the latter's advantage?
 Will the Soviets exercise preponderant influence in the Balkans after the war?
- *TOPIC 3. THE FUTURE OF EASTERN EUROPE.
 To what extent is Eastern Europe likely to become communist after the war?
 Do you think economic union could increase the well-being and the political independence of this region?
 What effect would a strong international organization have in modifying Soviet influence?

CHAPTER 6. EUROPE'S ALTERNATIVES.

- ‡§TOPIC 4. EUROPE'S ALTERNATIVES.
 Would a return to the old system of alliance and security blocks hold out any hope for peace?

Do you approve of the idea of British and Soviet spheres of influence, advocated by Lippmann?
What do you think of the author's plan for Federal organization of Europe? Would it provide adequate control of Germany?

¶ TOPIC 5. SIX PILLARS OF PEACE APPLIED TO EUROPE.

International Organization.

Is an international organization, with America an active member, important?

International Economic cooperation.

Were the multiplicity of trade barriers the cause of some of Europe's difficulties in the past?

Provision for Peaceful Change.

Might this correct some of the injustices which are almost inevitable following the war?

Colonies to be prepared for autonomy.

Would the attitude of trusteeship for colonies, with equal economic access to all countries remove one source of irritation?

Control of Armaments.

Is control of armaments by the international organization and their use to prevent aggression necessary to prevent future wars?

Intellectual and religious freedom.

Can there be a peaceful world, unless the citizens of each country have access to the truth?

TOPIC 6. THE CHRISTIAN ATTITUDE.

Is it wise or possible for us to isolate ourselves from the problems of Europe?

Should we encourage our government to cooperate in the rehabilitation of Europe?

Should we support our government in a more liberal economic policy after the war?

Can we help in a more brotherly attitude by tightening our bonds with the Christians of Europe?

* *Foreign Policy Report—The U.S.S.R. and Post-War Europe*

† *Spotlight on the Balkans—Stoyan*

‡ *Time for Decision—Wells*

§ *U.S. War Aims—Lippmann*

¶ *Statements on World Order*

APPENDIX

Statement on the Peace Settlement In Europe

With Special Reference to Germany

It is a special responsibility of the Christian Church in the United States to prepare the minds of the people of the nation for right relations with the German people after the war. One of the guiding principles that has controlled the thought of the American churches so far is "that it is contrary to the moral order that nations in their dealings with one another should be motivated by a spirit of revenge and retaliation." (Statement of Guiding Christian Principles, No. 3, adopted by the Protestant Conference at Delaware, Ohio, in March, 1942.) The churches have a special reason to know that there are many Germans whom Hitler does not represent for the resistance of German Christians, both Protestant and Catholic, is well known to them. As the Archbishop of Canterbury has recently said, "Church leaders in Germany have shown noble courage in upholding principles by which German conduct in Poland or Czechoslovakia or elsewhere is evidently condemned, and we honor them for their fearless witness." The Church also knows from its teaching that however one-sided may be the responsibility for the events which led directly to this war and for the horrors that have accompanied it, all nations share responsibility for the deeper evils of which they are symptoms. The sense of common guilt that Christians must feel when they contemplate the total crisis of our times will alone make possible reconciliation with the German people in the future. The Church should recognize the need for discipline in the peace in the interest of justice, but it should not despair of the people of any nation.

One necessary condition for world peace is a united policy with respect to Europe. If Europe is divided into independent spheres of influence without a significant agreement between the United States, Britain and Russia in the framework of a world organization, it will once again be the battleground, first in political struggles for power and then in war. A hopeful policy for Europe as a whole must include a plan that is designed to restore the people of Germany to health and sanity. The test of any policy for Germany must be: will this policy prepare the German people for a constructive part in European life ten years from now or will its chief effect be to keep Germany a center

of infection at the heart of Europe? It would be politically easy at first to reduce Germany to a state of virtual imprisonment but it would be impossible to keep the prison doors shut for long. This proved to be impossible after the last war. Such a policy of mere repression would arouse a spirit of resentment to the point of madness within Germany and sooner or later an atomic bomb would be let loose upon the

world. Since the peace of the world depends upon the peace of Europe and since the peace of Europe requires a constructive solution of the German problem we urge upon the governments of the United Nations that their policy in regard to Germany be based upon the following principles:

1. *The discipline of Germany because of the crimes she has committed should not be controlled by a spirit of vindictiveness but by concern for European recovery and peace.*

The defeat of Germany will in itself be a severe punishment. It will come after the destruction of many of her cities, after overwhelming losses in men and in national wealth. It will bring national humiliation. It will be followed by enforced disarmament immediately. Germany should restore stolen property as far as this is possible and she should aid in rebuilding what she has destroyed. But neither the economic stability of Europe as a whole nor the preparation of the people of Germany for freedom and peace would be served by extracting reparations from her over a long period.

The punishment of those most responsible for such acts of terror as the mass slaughter of the people in conquered countries, and the systematic extermination of the Jews of Europe, is an elementary demand of justice. Indeed crimes have been committed for which no conceivable punishment seems adequate, but such punishment should be limited to those whose responsibility is central and not extend to the soldiers who were implicated because they carried out orders. Some form of temporary segregation might be devised for those who were mere instruments in crime. For the United Nations to engage in a long continued program of cold-blooded mass executions would debauch the world.

2. *The dismemberment of Germany into separate states should not be imposed upon the Germans.*

The enforced division of Germany would heighten German nationalism and it would probably lead to the development of the fiercest irredentism that has ever afflicted Europe. The dismemberment of Germany into independent states unless provision were made for economic unity would strangle the economic life of the Germans and impair the prosperity of Europe. A political division of Germany which is widely supported by Germans themselves and which preserves economic unity

[75]

would not be open to the same objections if it were part of a larger federation of European states.

3. *Our policy in dealing with Germany should be calculated to strengthen the forces inside Germany which are committed to freedom and international cooperation.*

There are millions of Germans who have not been deeply corrupted by Nazism. In the churches, among the workers, and among liberals who have resisted Hitler "the other Germany" lives. It will be necessary to remove from power the leaders of National Socialism together with their accomplices among the industrialists, the military class and the reactionary landowners. But the cleansing of Germany—both its public life and its soul—from the poison of National Socialism must be primarily the work of Germans.

4. *While corrective and precautionary measures are taken to end the menace of Nazism and militarism in Germany, efforts should be made to enable the people of Germany to find for themselves the necessary economic conditions for a good life.*

In the Atlantic Charter it is said that the two nations represented "will endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all states, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity." This promise to vanquished as well as victors still stands. Those responsible for the policy of the United Nations should hold to it. An impoverished Germany will continue to be a menace to the peace of the world. Some method must be found to prevent German re-armament without depriving Germany of her industry. The permanent destruction of German industry would not only impoverish Germany but also lower the European standard of living.

John C. Bennett, *Chairman*
R. H. Edwin Espy
Harry Emerson Fosdick
Wm. Ernest Hocking
Rufus Jones
Wm. Allen Neilson
Reinhold Niebuhr
O. Frederick Nolde
Henry Pitney Van Dusen
Arnold Wolfers

May 31, 1944

[76]

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Advocates the encouragement of a democratic revolution after the war, under the leadership of labor and other liberal elements. Stresses the importance of civil liberties for the German people.

PEOPLE, CHURCH AND STATE IN MODERN RUSSIA
—Paul B. Anderson \$2.50
The Macmillan Co., 60 Fifth Avenue, New York, N. Y.

A carefully documented detailed story of the Russian Church. The most recent and accurate thing of its kind available.

RUSSIA AND POST-WAR EUROPE—David J. Dallin \$2.75
Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn.

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THE RUSSIAN ENIGMA—William Henry Chamberlain \$2.75
Charles Scribner's Sons, 597 Fifth Avenue, New York.

A realistic appraisal of the situation and the trends in Russia. Points out possible future problems.

TIME FOR DECISION—Sumner Welles \$3.00
Harper & Bros., 49 East 38th Street, New York.

Suggests the form which international organization should take. Advocates the breaking up of Germany into three states.

U.S. WAR AIMS—Walter Lippmann \$1.50
Little, Brown & Co., 60 East 42nd Street, New York.

Contains a review of our foreign policy, and outlines what he thinks should be our aims in the coming peace. Worth reading, though some of his conclusions are controversial.

[77]

PAMPHLETS

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Council for Social Action of the Congregational Christian Churches,
289 Fourth Avenue, New York.

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An interesting discussion of this important question by an American, a Chinese and a German.

[78]

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Includes the Guiding Principles, Six Pillars of Peace and the Joint Protestant, Catholic and Jewish Statement. These are the basic statements on World Order, which have been approved by the Federal Council of Churches.

The Federal Council of Churches
297 Fourth Avenue, New York

RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 10c.

A general educational pamphlet published by the joint committee on Religious Liberty of the Federal Council of Churches and the Foreign Missions Conference of N.A. It gives a brief survey of the importance of Religious Liberty in both National and International life.